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Abstract  
This	  paper	  finds	  further	  evidence	  using	  a	  Cointegrated	  Vector	  Autoregression	  to	  support	  claims	  against	  the	  Uncovered	  Interest	  Rate	  Parity	  (UIP)	  ex	  post,	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Forward	  Discount	  Anomaly	  (Fama,	  1984).	  This	  anomaly	  suggests	  predictable	  profits	  simply	  from	  investing	  in	  a	  country	  with	  a	  higher	  interest	  rate.	  Potential	  explanations	  could	  be	  attributed	  to	  risk	  or	  deviations	  from	  the	  rational	  expectations	  hypothesis.	  UIP	  ex	  ante	  is	  tested	  using	  survey	  data.	  These	  results	  indicate	  a	  time-­‐varying	  risk	  premium.	  Further	  it	  is	  found	  that	  this	  premium	  is	  related	  to	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  exchange	  rate	  and	  Purchasing-­‐Power-­‐Parity	  value.	  Additionally	  it	  is	  determined	  that	  investor	  expectations	  are	  consistent	  with	  some	  behavioral	  rules;	  extrapolative	  and	  adaptive	  expectations	  drive	  deviations	  from	  PPP	  which	  transitions	  to	  regressive	  expectations	  when	  the	  gap	  is	  very	  large.	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Introduction  
The  foreign  exchange  (FX)  market  continues  to  hold  its  puzzles.  This  is  clear  
from  the  fact  that  our  theories  about  the  market  have  little  or  no  predictive  
power.  One  such  puzzle  is  the  Foreign  Discount  Anomaly,  which  is  the  rejection  
of  the  Uncovered  Interest  Rate  Parity  (UIP)  ex  post.  The  Uncovered  Interest  Rate  
Parity  is  an  equilibrium  parity  condition  where  differences  in  returns  will  
equalize  across  the  two  countries.  The  Forward  Discount  Anomaly  implies  
predictable  profits  can  be  gained  by  simply  investing  in  the  country  with  the  
higher  interest  rate.  The  issue  may  be  that  there  is  either  some  perceived  risk  that  
prevents  full  arbitrage  or  individuals  are  not  forecasting  according  to  the  rational  
expectations  hypothesis  (REH)  and  are  simply  unaware  of  this  regularity.    
   This  paper  seeks  to  provide  further  insight  into  currency  returns  in  the  
foreign  exchange  market  by  utilizing  observed  investor  expectations  from  survey  
data  to  see  if  investor  expectations  follow  simple  behavioral  rules  and  an  
estimated  vector  autoregression  model  to  determine  if  there  is  a  risk  premium.  
The  sample  of  survey  data  shows  consistency  with  investors’  exchange  rate  
expectations  with  simple  behavioral  rules  formulated	  by	  Froot	  and	  Frankel	  (1987).  The  rejection  of  the  Uncovered  Interest  Rate  Parity  ex  ante,  by  the  sample  
of  survey  data  implies  a  significant  premium.  Further  examination  through  the  
estimated  Imperfect  Knowledge  Economics  Gap  Model  shows  its  relation  to  the  
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gap  between  the  currency’s  price  and  benchmark  Purchasing-­‐‑Power-­‐‑Parity  (PPP)  
value.  This  provides  evidence  in  support  of  a  risk  premium  and  the  theory  that  
risk  may  matter.  As  investors  evaluate  potential  investments  based  on  the  
differential  between  the  exchange  rate  and  PPP  value,  consistent	  with	  the	  prospect	  theory	  based	  Imperfect	  Knowledge	  Economics	  Gap	  Model	  (Frydman	  and	  Goldberg,	  2007).  This  model  proposes  that  the  risk  premium  co-­‐‑moves  with  the  
real  exchange  rate,  otherwise  the  ‘gap’  (the  difference  between  the  spot  rate  and  
underlying  PPP  value),  and  that  investors  perceive  more  risk  the  larger  this  gap.  
Therefore  requiring  a  higher  premium.  The  existence  of  the  risk  premium  
challenges  previous  assumptions  of  economic  models  in  which  agents  do  not  
consider  risk  when  evaluating  prospective  investments.	  
Foreign	  Exchange	  Market	  
The  foreign  exchange  market  is  the  world’s  largest  market  and  the  best  example  
of  perfect  competition  with  many  buyers  and  sellers  free  to  enter  and  exit.  
Trading  generates  large  amounts  of  information  that  are  quickly  disseminated  on  
asset  prices  and  interest  rates.  These  characteristics  make  the  foreign  exchange  
market  an  ideal  testing  ground  for  asset  pricing  theory.  In  view  of  the  volume  of  
trade  increases  and  importance  of  the  market,  it  is  pertinent  for  investors  to  
understand  the  factors  involved  in  the  market  that  influence  exchange  rates,  
affect  fundamentals  and  drive  returns.  
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   Over  the  past  several  decades,  there  has  been  significant  progress  in  
exchange  rate  economics,  one  of  the  most  challenging  areas  in  economic  
research,  especially  for  exchange  rate  determination  in  the  long  run  (Taylor,  
1995).  In  his  1995  paper,  “The  Economics  of  Exchange  Rates”  Mark  Taylor  
surveys  the  progress  made  in  understanding  exchange  rate  determination.  As  
new  models  developed,  each  incorporated  a  new  dynamic  of  international  
financial  markets.  
   Leading  up  to  the  1970s,  Taylor  notes  that  the  dominant  model  was  the  
open  Keynesian  model,  which  developed  into  the  Mundell-­‐‑Fleming  model.  
Robert  Mundell  and  J.  Marcus  Fleming  integrated  asset  markets  and  capital  
mobility  (Taylor,  1995).  The  distinct  feature  of  subsequent  models  developed  in  
the  1970s  was  their  basis  in  stock  market  equilibrium  theories  (Taylor,  1995).  
Subsequently  the  monetary  approach  developed,  where  supply  and  demand  of  
money  are  determinants  for  relative  prices  that  drive  exchange  rate  changes.  The  
monetary  model,  however,  falls  short:  “the  flexible-­‐‑price  monetary  model  (or  its  
real  interest  differential  variant)  ceases  to  provide  a  good  explanation  of  
variations  in  exchange  rate  data:  the  estimated  equations  break  down,  providing  
poor  fits,  exhibiting  incorrectly  signed  coefficients  and  failing  general  equation  
diagnostics  (Frankel  1993b)”  (Taylor,  1995).  Other  models  were  developed  and  
tested  from  equilibrium  and  liquidity  models,  to  portfolio  balance  models,  each  
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with  its  own  original  contribution,  and  each  with  its  own  inadequacies  in  
explaining  market  moments.  
   A  benchmark  for  testing  and  comparing  these  models  came  from  Richard  
Meese  and  Kenneth  Rogoff,  “In  a  landmark  paper,  Messe  and  Rogoff  (1983a)  
compare  the  out-­‐‑of-­‐‑sample  forecasts  produced  by  various  exchange  rate  models  
with  forecasts  produced  by  a  random  walk  model,  by  the  forward  exchange  rate,  
by  a  univariate  regression  of  the  spot  rate,  and  by  a  vector  autoregression”  
(Taylor,  1995).  A  random  walk  shows  that  the  best  estimate  for  the  future  
exchange  rate  is  whatever  the  exchange  rate  is  currently.  Meese  and  Rogoff  
showed  that  the  other  models  were  not  able  to  outperform  the  random  walk.  
This  result  has  not  been  overturned  by  subsequent  work.  
   Time  passed  and  a  new  approach  was  developed  in  response  to  a  
particular  anomaly.  The  market  microstructure  approach  looks  to  understand  
what  drives  short  run  deviations  away  from  fundamentals.  “In  this  literature,  
researchers  focus  on  the  behavior  of  market  agents  and  market  characteristics  
rather  than  on  the  influence  of  macro  fundamentals”  (Taylor,  1995).  This  focus  
arose  in  response  to  the  frequent  movements  of  exchange  rates  that  seemingly  
cannot  be  explained  by  the  underlying  fundamentals.  These  models  state  that  
movements  may  be  driven  by  the  influential  expectations  of  analysts  and  how  
information  is  processed  (Taylor,  1995).    
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   Despite  significant  progress  in  economic  research  there  is  still  even  more  
ground  that  remains  to  be  covered  and  explained.  Achieving  a  better  
understanding  of  exchange  rate  determination  becomes  more  important  as  the  
global  community  becomes  more  deeply  connected.  “In  an  increasingly  
interconnected  world,  the  exchange  rate  is  central  to  the  economic  performance  
of  a  country,  and  the  policy  options  available  should  be  adequate  to  the  needs  of  
promoting  growth,  price  stability,  and  income  equality”  (Vernengo  &  
Schönerwald  da  Silva,  2012).  Among  other  things,  exchange  rates  affect  trade,  
employment  and  inflation.  Understanding  their  fluctuations  and  how  best  to  
mitigate  the  risks  they  pose  is  key  to  countries’  and  international  firms’  growth.  
   Trade  in  the  foreign  exchange  market  is  growing  exponentially,  implying  
that  the  number  of  forces  acting  on  prices  is  growing  as  more  people  enter  the  
market  or  are  able  to  execute  more  trades  through  ever  advancing  technology.  
There  is  a  strong  belief  in  the  international  trading  community  that  price  patterns  
are  repeatable  and  that  people  and  their  emotions  drive  these  patterns.  “All  
through  time,  people  have  basically  acted  and  reacted  the  same  way  in  the  
market  as  a  result  of:  greed,  fear,  ignorance,  and  hope.  That  is  why  the  numerical  
formations  and  patterns  recur  on  a  constant  basis”  (Livermore,  2006).  The  
existence  of  these  natural  forces  in  financial  markets  has  been  discussed  in  a  
variety  of  economic  literature.  In  his  defense  of  a  flexible  exchange  regime  Milton  
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Friedman  discusses  the  many  merits  of  the  regime  as  well  as  influential  factors  
affecting  price  levels.  “For  many  changes  reflect  natural  changes  in  weather  
conditions  and  the  like;  others  arise  from  the  freedom  of  countless  individuals  to  
order  their  lives  as  they  will,  which  it  is  our  ultimate  goal  to  preserve  and  widen;  
and  yet  others  contain  the  seeds  of  progress  and  development”  (Friedman,  1953).  
Similarly  John  Maynard  Keynes  noted  similar  forces:  “Most,  probably,  of  our  
decisions  to  do  something  positive,  the  full  consequences  of  which  will  be  drawn  
out  over  many  days  to  come,  can  only  be  taken  as  a  result  of  animal  spirits  —  of  
a  spontaneous  urge  to  action  rather  than  inaction,  and  not  as  the  outcome  of  a  
weighted  average  of  quantitative  benefits  multiplied  by  quantitative  
probabilities”  (Keynes,  1936).  The  foreign  exchange  market  is  large,  with  many  
participants  and  an  extensive  amount  of  information  circulated  to  price  assets.  
Understanding  the  natural  forces  that  affect  these  transactions  and  their  
influence  on  investors’  expectations  could  help  provide  insight  into  foreign  
exchange  market  anomalies.  
Uncovered	  Interest	  Rate	  Parity	   	  
This  paper  examines  exchange  rate  behavior  and  returns  between  countries  
through  the  Uncovered  Interest  Rate  Parity.  This  parity  condition  provides  a  
simple  framework  for  analyzing  currency  returns  assuming  that  returns  equalize  
through  the  process  of  arbitrage.  Milton  Friedman  promotes  the  importance  of  
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interest  rates  in  the  determination  of  international  financial  market  conditions  by  
arguing,  “interest-­‐‑rate  changes  have  in  the  past  played  a  particularly  important  
role  in  adjustment  to  external  changes,  partly  because  they  have  been  susceptible  
to  direct  influence  by  monetary  authorities”  (Friedman,  1953).  UIP  theory  relates  
the  change  in  the  exchange  rate  to  the  level  of  the  interest  rate  differential.  Under  
UIP’s  assumptions,  returns  across  countries  would  equalize,  as  investors  would  
continue  to  invest  in  the  country  with  the  higher  interest  rate  with  the  
corresponding  exchange  rate  moving  in  a  way  to  offset  those  returns  over  time.  
   The  assumptions  of  UIP  are  perfect  capital  mobility,  investor  risk  
neutrality  and  that  investor  expectations  are  formed  in  accordance  with  the  
Rational  Expectations  Hypothesis  (REH).  Under  free  capital  mobility,  there  will  
be  an  unimpeded  capital  flow  driving  the  returns  in  the  two  currencies  to  
equalize  as  it  implies  the  interest  rate  at  home  will  equal  the  interest  rate  abroad.  
Any  slight  deviation  will  be  quickly  arbitraged  away.  The  next  of  these  
assumptions  is  that  if  one  country’s  returns  are  expected  to  be  higher,  the  market  
agent’s  only  care  about  the  point  forecast  of  mean  returns  and  not  the  risk  
associated  with  the  other  moments  of  the  distribution.  Finally,  the  impact  of  
expectations  being  correct  on  average,  up  to  a  white  noise  error,  will  also  drive  ex  
post  returns  to  equalize.  These  assumptions  were  derived  to  show  that  returns  
would  equalize  as  the  parity  condition  suggests.  Individuals  will  continue  to  
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invest  in  the  country  with  the  higher  expected  return  until  the  returns  between  
the  two  countries  equalize.  “If  the  risk-­‐‑neutral  markets  hypothesis  holds,  then  
the  expected  foreign  exchange  gain  from  holding  one  currency  rather  than  
another  (the  expected  exchange  rate  change)  must  be  just  offset  by  the  
opportunity  cost  of  holding  funds  in  this  currency  rather  than  the  other  (the  
interest  rate  differential)”  (Taylor,  1995).  To  illustrate  algebraically,  UIP  produces  
the  following  equation:   ∆!𝑠!!!! = 𝑖! − 𝑖!∗  
In  the  above  equation,  𝑠!  is  the  logarithm  of  the  spot  exchange  and  superscript  e  
denotes  the  expectation  for  the  future  value  at  period  t+k.  Maturity  is  reached  at  
time  k.  Both  i  and  i*  are  the  nominal  interest  rates  for  the  domestic  and  foreign  
countries,  respectively.  Primarily,  researchers  have  tested  foreign  exchange  
market  efficiency  through  regression  analysis  of  the  spot  and  forward  exchange  
rates  (Taylor,  1995).  Assuming  the  Covered  Interest  Parity  holds1,  so  the  interest  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	   𝑖! − 𝑖!∗ − 𝑓! ! − 𝑠! = 0	  (Taylor,	  1995)	  
In  this  parity  condition,  market  participants,  perhaps  those  looking  to  hedge  
against  foreign  exchange  market  risk,  observe  the  following  condition,  re-­‐‑written  
from  above:   𝐶𝐷 = !!!!!! + !!!!!! 𝑖∗ + 𝑖∗ − 𝑖,  
Where  CD  is  the  covered  differential,  which  establishes  a  strict  relationship  
between  the  forward  premium,  !!!!!! ,  and  the  interest  rate  differentials.  Deviations  
from  the  covered  differential  could  arise  from  transaction  costs  associated  with  
investing  in  the  foreign  exchange  market,  margin  requirements,  government  
regulation  or  taxation,  a  risk  premium,  or  the  cost  of  gathering  information.  
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rate  differential  is  equal  to  the  forward  premium,  the  parameters  for  UIP  can  be  
tested  through  the  following  regression  analysis  (Taylor,  1995):  
∆!𝑠!!! = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑓! ! − 𝑠! + 𝜂!!!  
under  rational  expectations,  the  only  difference  between  the  expected  change  in  
exchange  rate  and  the  actual  change  in  the  exchange  rate  is  the  white  noise  
forecast  error.  Instead  of  incorporating  the  interest  rate  differential,  Mark  Taylor  
describes  the  regression  that  estimates  the  coefficient  of  the  difference  between  
the  logarithm  of  the  forward  rate  for  maturity,  𝑓! ! ,  and  the  spot  rate,  𝑠! ,  for  k  
periods.  The  interest  differential  can  be  substituted  for  the  forward  rate  because  
of  the  covered  differential,  as  previously  noted,  allowing  for  tests  of  market  
efficiency.  The  magnitude  of  the  white  noise  error,  if  investors  were  forming  
REH  expectations,  would  not  be  significant  and  the  returns  across  countries  
would  offset  and  equalize  through  arbitrage.  “If  investors  are  risk-­‐‑neutral  and  
have  rational  expectations,  we  should  expect  the  slope  parameter,  β,  to  be  equal  
to  one  and  the  disturbance  term  𝜂!!!  –  the  rational  expectations  forecast  error  
under  the  null  hypothesis  –  to  be  uncorrelated  with  the  information  available  at  
the  time  t”  (Taylor,  1995).  For  example  if  the  U.S.  has  a  higher  interest  rate  than  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Through  the  process  of  arbitrage,  these  price  differentials  are  exploited  and  
return  back  to  equilibrium.  
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the  U.K.,  the  dollar  should  be  expected  to  lose  value  relative  to  the  pound  
sterling  by  that  exact  percentage  difference.  
   There  are  many  financial  anomalies2  that  remain  unexplained  in  
international  macroeconomics.  Froot  and  Thaler  discuss  anomalies,  defined  as,  
“an  empirical  result  qualifies  as  an  anomaly  if  it  is  difficult  to  ’rationalize’,  or  if  
implausible  assumptions  are  necessary  to  explain  it  within  the  paradigm”  (Froot  
and  Thaler,  1990).  The  focus  of  this  paper  is  the  Forward  Discount  Anomaly,  a  
major  puzzle  in  international  macroeconomics.  This  puzzle  arises  because  
returns  do  not  tend  to  equalize  across  countries,  as  implied  by  the  rejection  of  the  
Uncovered  Interest  Parity  theory  ex  post  and  the  efficient  markets  hypothesis  
assumptions.  For  the  condition  to  hold,  the  β  coefficient  should  equal  unity  and  
the  α  intercept,  zero.  In  fact  the  estimated  𝛽  is  found,  in  previous  estimated  
models,  to  be  not  only  consistently  less  than  one  but  often  negative,  implying  
that  simply  investing  in  the  country  with  the  higher  interest  rate  would  yield  
predictable  profits.  An  alarming  market  inefficiency.  In  his  1984  paper,  “Forward  
and  Spot  Exchange  Rates”,  Eugene  F.  Fama  investigated  the  degree  to  which  
forward  exchange  rates  are  able  to  forecast  future  spot  exchange  rates.  Fama  
(1984)  also  examines  whether  forward  rates  have  time  varying  premiums.  By  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Other	  puzzles	  discussed	  in	  Obstfeld  and  Rogoff  (2001):  home-­‐‑bias-­‐‑in-­‐‑trade  
puzzle,  the  Feldstein-­‐‑Horioka  puzzle,  home-­‐‑bias  portfolio  puzzle,  the  
consumption  correlations  puzzle,  the  Purchasing-­‐‑Power-­‐‑Parity  puzzle  and  the  
exchange  rate  disconnect  puzzle	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testing  a  model  for  combined  measurement  of  the  two  components  of  forward  
rates,  the  variation  in  the  premium  and  expected  future  spot  rate,  Fama  finds  
support  that  both  aspects  vary  through  time.  “More  startling  are  the  conclusions  
that  (a)  most  of  the  variation  in  forward  rates  is  variation  in  the  premiums,  and  
(b)  the  premium  and  expected  future  spot  rate  components  of  forward  rate  are  
negatively  correlated”  (Fama,  1984).  He  estimated  the  following  regression:  𝑆!!! − 𝑆! = 𝛼! + 𝛽! 𝐹! − 𝑆! + 𝜀!,!!!.  
Where,  𝑆!!! − 𝑆!  is  the  difference  between  the  future  and  current  spot  rate.  Then,  𝐹! − 𝑆!  is  the  current  forward-­‐‑spot  differential.  This  model  is  estimated  to  see  if  
there  is  any  predictive  success  of  the  forward-­‐‑spot  differential  with  the  future  
change  in  the  spot  rate.  Fama  observes  negative  values  for  𝛽!,  which  is  consistent  
with  previous  literature’s  estimates.  The  failure  of  estimated  models  to  produce  
an  estimated  value  of  1.0,  suggested  by  an  efficient  market  hypothesis,  pushes  
economists  to  revise  assumptions  and  look  for  explanations.  
   As  observed  by  Pierre-­‐‑Olivier  Gourinchas  and  Aaron  Tornell,  
“Accordingly,  the  forward  premium  is  always  a  biased  predictor  of  future  
depreciation;  the  bias  can  be  so  severe  as  to  lead  to  negative  coefficients  in  the  
‘Fama’  regression”  (Gourinchas  and  Tornell,  2004).  Froot  and  Thaler  summarize  
the  evidence  against  UIP  ex  post,  “a  very  large  literature  has  tested  the  
unbiasdness  hypothesis  and  found  that  the  coefficient  𝛽  is  reliably  less  than  one.  
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In  fact,  𝛽  is  frequently  estimated  to  be  less  than  zero”  (Froot  and  Thaler  1990).  
The  question  presented  by  UIP’s  rejection  ex  post  is  why  aren’t  investors  
exploiting  these  opportunities  until  they  disappear?  The  expected  utility  theory  
based  REH  models  have  also  been  rejected  (Capital  Asset  Pricing  Model  (CAPM)  
and  Consumption  CAPM).  This  anomaly  represents  an  inability  to  explain  price  
movements  in  the  world’s  largest  and  arguably  most  competitive  market,  a  
major  challenge  to  economic  theory.  Possible  explanations  have  been  suggested,  
for  instance  a  time  varying  risk  premium  in  the  forward  rate  (Fama,  1984)  but  
require  further  investigation.  
   As  Charles  Engel  shows  in  his  1996  survey  of  the  Forward  Discount  
Anomaly  and  risk  premium,  the  estimated  β  coefficient  for  UIP  is  not  1,  as  
hypothesized.  Engel  reports  on  the  previous  research  by  Hodrick  (1987)3  where  
the  future  exchange  rate  is  negatively  related  to  the  forward  discount.  The  
corresponding  β  coefficient  is  often  less  than  1,  and  most  often  found  to  be  
negative.  Engel  also  surveys  models  and  test  procedures  for  the  risk  premiums.  
These  models  include  the  CAPM,  latent  variable  model  and  portfolio-­‐‑balance  
models  of  risk  premiums.  Engel  defines  the  risk  premium:  𝑟𝑝!!" = 𝑓! − 𝐸!(𝑠!!!)  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Most	  notable	  seminal	  studies	  on	  forward	  and	  spot	  exchange	  rates:	  Fama	  1984	  and	  Bilson	  1978	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where,  𝑟𝑝!!",  is  the  foreign  exchange  risk  premium.  This  implies  that  under  risk  
neutrality,  agents  will  drive  f,  the  log  of  the  forward  exchange  rate,  to  equality  
with  expectations  of  the  future  spot  rate,  E(st+1).  If  this  were  the  case,  under  
rational  expectations  expected  profits  would  be  zero  (Engel,  1996).  Regression  
results  show  this  is  not  the  case,  and  that  there  are  seemingly  unexploited  
opportunities  for  profit  in  the  foreign  exchange  market,  otherwise  known  as  the  
Forward  Discount  Anomaly.  
Behavioral	  Economics	  
Through  the  pioneering  work  of  behavioral  economics,  we  are  allowed  a  deeper  
understanding  of  asset  prices  and  their  deviation  from  fundamental  benchmark  
values.  Barberis  and  Thaler  discuss  some  of  these  advances  in  their  Survey  of  
Behavioral  Finance,  concluding  that  “these  papers  are  important  existence  proofs,  
showing  that  it  is  possible  to  think  coherently  about  asset  pricing  while  
incorporating  salient  aspects  of  human  behavior”  (Barberis  and  Thaler,  2003).  
Just  as  an  asset  pricing  approach  helps  to  understand  currency  movements,  so  
too  does  behavioral  finance  provide  insight  into  asset  prices  and  the  human  
forces  that  drive  the  movements  in  those  prices.  
   Behavioral  economics  studies  the  cognitive  and  emotional  factors  in  
economic  decision  making.  The  application  of  behavioral  economics  to  explain  
some  financial  phenomena  is  known  as  behavioral  finance.  “Behavioral  finance  
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argues  that  some  financial  phenomena  can  plausibly  be  understood  using  
models  in  which  some  agents  are  not  fully  rational”  (Barberis  and  Thaler,  2003).  
Many  of  the  observations  of  human  behavior  that  provide  foundations  for  
models  in  behavioral  finance  are  derived  from  the  experimental  findings  of  
cognitive  psychology.  Despite  the  inability  of  previous  economic  models  to  
explain  certain  persistent  phenomena,  there  has  been  reluctance  to  incorporate  
such  findings  into  economic  research.  Nicholas  Barberis  and  Richard  Thaler  list  
reasons  for  hesitation  in  their  survey  of  behavioral  finance:  
Economists  are  sometimes  wary  of  this  body  of  experimental  
evidence  because  they  believe  (i)  that  people,  through  reputation  
will  learn  their  way  out  of  biases;  (ii)  that  experts  in  a  field,  such  as  
traders  in  an  investment  bank  will  make  fewer  errors;  and  (iii)  that  
with  more  powerful  incentives,  the  effects  will  disappear.  (Barberis  
and  Thaler,  2003)  
Many  of  the  discoveries  of  behavioral  finance  over  the  past  few  years,  have  been  
tentatively  applied  to  stock  markets,  with  results  that  are  promising.  
   Behavioral  finance  could  add  clarity  to  foreign  exchange  markets  by  
incorporating  more  accurate  descriptions  of  human  behavior  than  previous  
models.  “Economists  once  thought  behavior  was  either  rational  or  impossible  to  
formalize”  (Barberis  and  Thaler,  2003).  Through  the  findings  of  cognitive  
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psychology  and  the  pioneering  work  of  psychologists  and  behavioral  economists  
alike,  it  is  now  evident  that  these  processes  are  possible  to  understand  and  that  
previous  models  can  be  enhanced  by  incorporating  assumptions  that  more  
accurately  depict  real  human  behavior.  It  is  widely  accepted  that  investors’  
expectations  influence  international  financial  market  outcomes.  Assumptions  
and  formulas  that  more  aptly  describe  their  behavior  therefore  seems  a  first  and  
crucial  step  towards  better  economic  understanding.  
   Applying  a  behavioral  finance  framework  to  the  foreign  exchange  market,  
Paul  DeGrauwe  and  Marianna  Grimaldi  (2006)  construct  simple  and  complex  
behavioral  rules  to  illustrate  their  foreign  exchange  market  observations  and  
how  investors  form  their  expectations.  “Agents  are  aware  of  the  exceptional  
complexity  of  the  world  in  which  they  live.  They  will  therefore  follow  a  different  
forecasting  strategy  than  the  one  the  rational  expectations  model  assumes,  in  
which  individual  agents  can  store  and  process  all  relevant  information  in  their  
brain.”  (DeGrauwe  and  Grimaldi,  2006).  In  accordance  with  psychological  
literature,  they  propose  that  agents  use  simplifying  heuristics,  commonly  
described  as  anomalies  of  human  behavior,  taking  in  small  parts  of  an  overly  
large  and  complex  world  to  formulate  their  expectations.  They  discuss  two  
discoveries  of  cognitive  psychology  in  their  survey  of  behavioral  finance  before  
constructing  their  own  model  from  their  own  separate  observations.  The  first  
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being  “framing”,  where  individuals’  decisions  are  affected  by  the  way  choices  
are  presented  (Kahneman  and  Tversky,  1981).  The  second  anomaly  mentioned  is  
prospect  theory  (Kahneman  and  Tversky,  1979).  Prospect  theory  shows  that,  in  
contrast  to  the  expected  utility  theory,  utility  of  gains  and  disutility  of  losses  are  
derived  from  changes  in  financial  wealth  and  not  the  overall  level.  Where  the  
disutility  of  a  loss  is  greater  than  the  utility  of  an  equivalent  gain.  Prospect  
theory  will  be  discussed  in  more  detail  later  in  this  paper.  DeGrauwe  and  
Grimaldi  propose  that  when  agents  are  forming  their  expectations  in  complex  
markets  they  use  simple  forecasting  rules.  Agents  base  their  decision  on  what  
rule  to  use  by  comparing  the  profitability  of  ex  post  returns.  These  heuristics  do  
not  guarantee  optimal  results  but  afford  the  agent  a  way  of  using  experience-­‐‑
based  techniques  to  solve  problems  and  make  decisions  in  the  face  of  complexity.  
With  this  understanding,  they  propose  simple  forecasting  rules  and  a  formula  for  
how  investors  choose  between  the  methods.  When  approaching  complex  
informational  problems,  agents  will  sift  through  the  information  with  
experienced  based  techniques  to  come  to  a  decision  of  how  to  act  in  the  market.  
Explanations	  
This  paper  is  an  investigation  into  why  UIP  does  not  hold  ex  post,  and  further  
examines  possible  explanations  where  the  differences  in  returns  could  be  
explained  by  a  varying  risk  premium  or  if  investors  are  forming  expectations  in  
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accord  with  simple  behavioral  rules.  In  approaching  the  Forward  Discount  
Anomaly,  three  questions  must  be  considered:  Is  there  a  time-­‐‑varying  risk  
premium?  If  so  what  explains  it?  Lastly  how  can  we  characterize  expectations  
about  the  exchange  rate?  This  paper  examines  the  Forward  Discount  Anomaly  
from  the  approach  that  there  may  be  a  risk  premium  and/or  investors  may  be  
forming  non-­‐‑REH  expectations.  The  first  possible  explanation  challenges  UIP’s  
assumption  of  risk  neutrality.  
   UIP  assumes  individuals  will  invest  in  the  higher  expected  return  country,  
and  do  not  care  about  risk  or  the  other  moments  of  the  return  distribution.  
Investors  are  apparently  leaving  opportunities  for  profit  unexploited  in  the  
foreign  exchange  market.  This  behavior  is  in  contrast  to  the  assumption  of  risk  
neutrality.  It  therefore  seems  possible  that  these  potentially  more  profitable  
investments  may  be  considered  riskier  and  therefore  less  attractive  as  investors  
would  require  a  higher  premium  for  holding  that  asset.  
   The  second  possible  explanation  is  with  the  assumption  of  rational  
expectations,  where  individuals’  forecast  errors  are  just  a  white-­‐‑noise  error  or  
they  are  forecasting  in  a  way  with  perfect  foresight.  This  would  allow  economists  
to  represent  expected  changes  in  the  exchange  rate  with  the  actual  future  change  
in  the  exchange  rate.  
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   In  their  paper,  Jeffrey  Frankel  and  Kenneth  Froot  (1989)  use  survey  data  to  
measure  exchange  rate  expectations.  Their  research  looks  to  answer  two  
questions,  “how  best  to  describe  the  survey  expectations  formation;  and  whether  
investors’  expectations  are  unbiased  forecasts  of  the  actual  spot  exchange  rate  
process”  (Frankel  and  Froot,  1990).  As  they  investigate  the  answer  to  these  two  
questions,  Frankel  and  Froot  offer  a  way  to  test  rational  expectations:  “The  
simplest  possible  test  of  rational  expectations  is  to  see  if  expectations  are  
unconditionally  biased,  if  investors  systematically  overpredict  or  underpredict  
the  future  spot  rate”  (Frankel  and  Froot,  1989).  As  evidenced  in  the  70s  and  80s  
investors  consistently  under  then  over  predicted  the  future  value  of  foreign  
currencies  relative  to  the  US  dollar.  This  observation  emphasizes  the  need  to  
consider  different  explanations  over  time.  
   Frankel  and  Froot  (1989)  then  examine  another  puzzle:  why  the  gap  
between  the  forward  discount  and  expected  rate  of  depreciation  in  the  survey  
data  is  so  large.  They  offer  two  possible  explanations:  the  gap  is  a  risk  premium  
or  investor  expectations  are  heterogeneous.  Frankel  and  Froot  (1990)  state  that  in  
order  for  the  difference  to  be  a  risk  premium,  there  has  to  be  two  requirements,  
“(a)  that  assets  denominated  in  other  currencies  were  perceived  in  the  early  
1980’s  as  riskier  than  assets  denominated  in  dollars,  and  (b)  that  investors  are  
highly  risk  averse”  (Frankel  and  Froot,  1990).  While  Frankel  and  Froot  (1989)  
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conclude  that  they  are  unable  to  find  the  existence  of  a  premium  while  pooling  
across  exchange  rates,  later  studies  that  don’t  replicate  this  exact  form  of  analysis  
do.  If  these  conditions  are  met,  modeling  the  changing  risk  preferences  becomes  
a  first  and  crucial  step  to  better  understanding  investor  behavior  and  their  
subsequent  influences  in  financial  markets.  
Risk:	  Re-­‐examined	  
Prospect  Theory  
To  look  at  the  former  of  the  two  explanations,  this  paper  uses  a  model  that  
incorporates  the  experimental  findings  of  Daniel  Kahneman  and  the  late  Amos  
Tversky  (1979).  In  their  paper,  Barberis  and  Thaler  note  the  significance  of  the  
work  of  Kahneman  and  Tversky:  
Thanks  largely  to  the  work  of  cognitive  psychologists  such  as  
Daniel  Kahneman  and  Amos  Tversky,  we  now  have  a  long  list  of  
robust  empirical  findings  that  catalogue  some  of  the  ways  in  which  
actual  humans  form  expectations  and  make  choices.  There  has  also  
been  progress  in  writing  down  formal  models  of  these  processes,  
with  prospect  theory  being  the  most  notable.  (Barberis  and  Thaler,  
2003).  
Kahneman  and  Tversky  found  that  individuals’  risk  preferences  are  quite  
different  from  the  standard  theory.  What  matters  is  not  the  level  of  wealth  with  
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diminishing  returns,  rather  the  change  in  wealth  with  a  much  greater  disutility  
from  a  loss  than  utility  from  an  equal  magnitude  gain  with  diminishing  
sensitivity  to  both.  Through  prospect  theory  Daniel  Kahneman  and  Amos  
Tversky  have  shown  that  individuals’  risk  preferences  are  not  stagnant,  but  
rather  subject  to  change  relevant  to  recent  experiences.  
   In  establishing  the  basis  for  prospect  theory  Kahneman  and  Tversky  offer  
a  critique  of  the  assumptions  of  expected  utility  theory,  providing  many  
instances  in  which  experiment  participants  violate  the  framework.  Expected  
utility  theory  suggests  that  probabilities  weight  the  utility  of  outcomes.  
Kahneman  and  Tversky  coin  the  name  of  effects  that  cause  participants  to  act  in  a  
specific  way  –  often  in  stark  contrast  of  what  the  expected  utility  theory  would  
hypothesize.  The  first  of  these  effects,  they  label  the  Certainty  Effect,  where  
people  will  often  place  greater  significance  on  outcomes  that  are  considered  
certain  when  compared  with  outcomes  that  are  only  considered  possible.  
Experiment  participants  were  given  monetary  values  and  degrees  of  certainty  
that  they  would  receive  either  value  in  a  given  option.  For  instance:  
Problem  1:  Choose  between
A. 2,500  with  probability   .33,  
2,400  with  probability   .66,  
0  with  probability      .01;  
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B. 2,400  with  certainty.  
   They  found  that  82  percent  of  participants  opted  for  the  option  that  was  
certain.  These  choice  problems  are  similar  to  other  well-­‐‑known  counter-­‐‑examples  
of  the  expected  utility  theory.  Maurice  Allais  first  presented  these  counter-­‐‑
examples  in  1953  (Kahneman  and  Tversky,  1979).  These  problems  capture  
varying  degrees  of  risk  preferences.  Experiment  participants  choose  options  with  
the  lesser  monetary  value  with  certainty  rather  than  the  greater  value  but  also  
greater  risk.  Kahneman  and  Tversky  are  able  to  capture  these  behaviors  into  the  
framework  of  their  prospect  theory.  
   Curious  about  the  effect  opposite  signs  but  equal  magnitudes  would  have  
on  outcomes  of  the  same  problems,  Kahneman  and  Tversky  gave  outcomes  the  
opposite  sign  and  again  posed  the  problems  to  experiments  participants.  Like  the  
previous  experiments,  these  new  choices  yielded  interesting  results.  They  found  
that  given  the  same  probabilities  but  the  opposite  value  for  each  outcome  
experiment  participants  will  take  the  greater  magnitude  loss  with  probability  
over  the  lesser  value  loss  with  certainty.  The  results  from  their  experiment  show  
that  risk  averse  behavior  becomes  risk  seeking,  as  participants  are  more  willing  
to  try  their  odds  with  a  greater  loss  that  is  merely  probable  than  a  loss  of  lesser  
value  but  certainty.  This  anomaly  was  named,  the  Reflection  Effect  (Kahneman  
and  Tversky,  1979).  This  behavior  violates  expected  utility  theory  by  showing  
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that  agent  risk  preferences  vary  depending  on  how  the  choices  are  presented  and  
do  not  choose  the  greater  monetary  value  option  with  consistency.  
   Offering  a  general  description  of  the  phases  involved  in  prospect  theory  
Kahneman  and  Tversky  (1979)  describe  the  following  processes  involved  in  
making  decisions.  The  first  phase  is  the  editing  phase  and  involves  the  initial  
analysis  of  choices  being  considered.  This  analysis  is  then  followed  by  the  
evaluation  phase,  where  the  best  prospect  is  chosen.  The  editing  phase  serves  the  
purpose  of  simplifying  the  prospects  being  considered  through  three  different  
steps:  coding,  combination,  segregation  and  cancellation.  Coding  involves  a  
reference  point  and  states  individuals  look  at  final  outcomes  from  decisions  as  
gains  and  losses  rather  than  the  final  level  of  wealth.  Combination  involves  
combining  probabilities  of  matching  outcomes.  Segregation  separates  
components  of  each  prospect  with  varying  degrees  of  risk.  Cancellation  is  where  
agents  ignore  aspects  of  prospective  choices.  This  last  process  simplifies  the  
choice  but  often  biases  the  subject  towards  one  prospect  or  another  because  they  
may  have  overlooked  certain  elements  of  either  prospect.  “Many  anomalies  of  
preference  result  from  the  editing  of  prospects.  For  example,  the  inconsistences  
associated  with  the  isolation  effect  result  from  the  cancellation  of  common  
components.  Some  intransitivities  of  choice  are  explained  by  a  simplification  that  
eliminates  small  differences  between  prospects”  (Kahneman  and  Tversky,  1979).    
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A  direct  result  of  many  of  these  operations  is  that  agents  will  often  demonstrate  
inconsistent  preferences.  
   The  evidence  against  expected  utility  theory  spurs  the  formulation  of  
prospect  theory.  The  basic  equation  of  this  theory:  
𝑉 𝑥 =    𝑥!  𝑖𝑓  𝑥   ≥ 0−𝜆 −𝑥 !   𝑖𝑓  𝑥 < 0    
(Tversky  and  Kahneman,  1992).  This  piecewise  linear  function  is  Kahneman  and  
Tversky’s  value  function  that  shows  algebraically:  loss  aversion  and  diminishing  
sensitivity  to  subsequent  gains  and  losses  (Tversky  and  Kahneman,  1992).  Graph  
1  shows  the  movements  in  this  value  function,  as  gains  are  listed  in  the  top  
equation  and  losses  in  the  bottom  equation.  The  λ  coefficient  differentiates  the  
effect  of  losses  from  gains,  as  the  loss  curve  is  steeper  at  points  for  equal  
magnitude  gains.  This  function  is  the  quantitative  description  of  their  data  from  
the  experiments  run.  “An  essential  feature  of  the  present  theory  is  that  the  
carriers  of  value  are  changes  in  wealth  or  welfare,  rather  than  final  states”  
(Kahneman  and  Tversky,  1979).  This  component  of  the  theory  is  illustrated  
through  the  value  function  and  provides  the  reasoning  for  the  value  function’s  
features.  They  are  based  on  movements  away  from  the  reference  point,  are  
generally  concave  for  gains  and  convex  for  losses,  and  the  losses  slope  is  steeper  
than  the  slope  for  gains.  The  shape  of  the  value  function  was  derived  from  an  
experiment  where  participants’  preference  for  risky  choices  given  probabilities  
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for  given  outcomes  show  that  82%  of  participants  prefer  a  25%  chance  of  
obtaining  $4,000  or  a  25%  of  obtaining  $2,000  over  a  25%  of  gaining  $6,000.  
Consistent  with  the  reflection  effect  previously  mentioned  participants  preferred  










  Kahneman  and  Tversky  offer  the  following  summary  of  the  value  function,  “we  
have  proposed  the  value  function  is  (i)  defined  on  deviations  from  the  reference  
point;  (ii)  generally  concave  for  gains  and  commonly  convex  for  losses;  (iii)  
steeper  for  losses  than  for  gains”  (Kahneman  and  Tversky,  1979).  The  value  
function,  highlighting  that  individuals  are  risk  averse  with  gains  and  risk  seeking  
with  losses  -­‐‑  where  gains  and  losses  are  compared  to  a  reference  point  -­‐‑  is  then  
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function  attributes  weights  to  the  value  of  the  results.  Decision  weights  are  not  
simply  probabilities  associated  with  outcomes.  “Decision  weights  measure  the  
impact  of  events  on  the  desirability  of  prospects,  and  not  merely  the  perceived  
likelihood  of  these  events”  (Kahneman  and  Tversky,  1979).  One  observed  aspect  
of  the  weighting  function  is  that  given  probabilities  with  a  fixed  ratio,  decision  
weights  are  nearer  to  one  with  low  probabilities.  
   It  is  important  to  note  the  validity  of  experimental  data.  “By  default,  the  
method  of  hypothetical  choices  emerges  as  the  simplest  procedure  by  which  a  
large  number  of  theoretical  questions  can  be  investigated”  (Kahneman,  2013).  
Kahneman  and  Tversky  repeat  experiments  from  their  earlier  years  with  Israeli  
subjects,  in  the  Israeli  army,  later  with  University  students.  The  results  in  both  
cases  were  almost  identical.  The  experimental  method  relies  on  several  
assumptions:  “that  people  often  know  how  they  would  behave  in  actual  
situational  choice,  and  on  further  assumption  that  the  subjects  have  no  special  
reason  to  disguise  their  true  preferences”  (Kahneman  and  Tversky,  1979).  The  
experiments  have  reasonable  accuracy  in  predicting  people’s  true  preferences.  
Since  the  experimental  data  shows  repeated  violations  of  the  expected  utility  
theory,  it  therefore  provides  significant  evidence  that  a  new  way  of  modeling  
market  agents’  risk  preferences  should  be  considered.  
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   The  equity  premium  puzzle  offers  a  similar  dilemma  as  the  Forward  
Discount  Anomaly.  “The  core  of  the  equity  premium  puzzle  is  that  even  though  
stocks  appear  to  be  an  attractive  asset  –  they  have  high  average  returns  and  a  low  
covariance  with  consumption  growth  –  investors  appear  very  unwilling  to  hold  
them.  In  particular,  they  appear  to  demand  a  substantial  risk  premium  in  order  
to  hold  the  market  supply”  (Barberis  and  Thaler,  2003).  Progress  was  made  with  
this  puzzle  by  replacing  the  assumptions  of  expected  utility  theory  with  loss  
aversion  and  assuming  REH  by  Nicholas  Barberis,  Ming  Huang  and  Tano  
Santos.  “We  study  asset  prices  in  an  economy  where  investors  derive  direct  
utility  not  only  from  consumption  but  also  from  fluctuations  in  the  value  of  their  
financial  wealth.  They  are  loss  averse  over  these  fluctuations,  and  the  degree  of  
loss  aversion  depends  on  their  prior  investment  performance”  (Barberis  et  al.,  
2001).  In  their  paper  they  advocate  a  different  approach  to  thinking  about  the  
aggregate  stock  market.  This  approach  is  influenced  by  prospect  theory  and  
provides  fruitful  explanations  to  the  high  mean,  excess  volatility  and  
predictability  of  stock  returns  coupled  with  a  low  correlation  of  consumption  
growth  that  is  observed  in  financial  puzzles.  In  some  instances  this  effect  is  
attributed  to  the  house  money  effect,  where  agents  display  more  risk  seeking  
behavior  with  money  they  have  won  or  recently  gained.  People  are  more  willing  
to  hold  specific  assets  because  of  the  higher  expected  rate  of  return.  This  effect,  
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however,  is  contradicted  by  survey  data  (Frydman  and  Goldberg,  2007).  In  their  
model,  Barberis  et  al.  (2001),  models  dividend  growth  in  the  following  way:  
log 𝐷!!!𝐷! = 𝑔! + 𝜎!𝜖!!!  
Then  in  an  effort  to  maximize  consumption,  the  specification  preferences  are  
modeled  in  accordance  to  some  standard  features  of  asset  pricing  models.  
𝐸[ (𝜌! 𝐶!!!!1− 𝛾 + 𝑏! !!! 𝜌!!!𝑣 𝑋!!!, 𝑆! , 𝑧! )]  
Their  first  term  illustrates  utility  over  consumption,  𝐶!.  Power  utility  is  
incorporated  in  the  model  and  ρ  represents  the  time  discount  factor.  The  
curvature  of  the  utility  function  is  maintained  with  γ>0.  The  second  term  defines  
utility  derived  from  fluctuations  in  financial  wealth.  𝑋!!!  gives  the  gain  or  loss  
experienced  by  the  investor  from  current,  t,  to  t+1.  𝑠!  is  the  variable  showing  the  
investor’s  asset  holdings  considered  risky  at  time  t.  𝑧!  measures  gains  and  losses  
before  time  t,  as  a  proportion  of  𝑠! .  These  variables  allow  Barberis  et  al.  (2001)  to  
show  investor’s  prior  performance  and  the  subsequent  effect  on  risk  preferences.  
One  of  the  most  salient  aspects  of  the  model  is  the  evaluation  of  assets.  This  
provides  the  reference  point,  which  is  the  basis  for  fluctuations  in  financial  
wealth  and  therefore  provides  utility  or  disutility  for  gains  and  losses  
respectively.  Barberis  et  al.  (2001)  have  the  following  framework  for  their  model:  𝑋!!! = 𝑆!𝑅!!! − 𝑆!𝑅!,!  
	  	   32	  
this  illustrates  how  investors  are  disappointed  if  their  returns  don’t  match  the  
riskless  return  in  any  given  economy.  “Our  results  suggest  that  a  model  which  
relies  on  loss  aversion  alone  cannot  provide  a  complete  description  of  aggregate  
stock  market  behavior”  (Barberis  et  al.,  2001).  Such  a  model  would  fall  short  in  
explaining  volatility.  In  their  model  economy  where  investors  receive  utility  
from  fluctuations  of  financial  wealth,  risk  preferences  are  based  on  prior  
investment  performance,  and  loss  aversion  overall  has  traction  with  historical  
data  of  asset  prices.  This  progress  in  the  aggregate  stock  market  for  
understanding  returns  with  prospect  theory  based  models  shows  the  potential  
for  similar  progress  to  be  made  in  understanding  currency  returns.  Similar  to  the  
work  of  Benartzi  and  Thaler  (1995),  their  model  provides  an  alternative  to  the  
consumption-­‐‑based  approach  and  incorporates  “prospect-­‐‑type  utility”.  The  
success  of  Benartzi  and  Thaler  gives  rise  to  the  implications  of  a  formal  pricing  
model  incorporating  prospect  theory  and  providing  further  insight  into  average  
returns.  
Imperfect  Knowledge  Economics  –  Gap  model  
The  model  this  paper  applies  to  explain  the  risk  premium  is  Roman  Frydman  
and  Michael  Goldberg’s  Imperfect  Knowledge  Economics  gap  model.  “The  other  
aggregate  regularity  that  we  model  involves  the  market  risk  premium  –  the  
anticipated  excess  return  that  market  participants  in  the  aggregate  require  in  
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order  to  hold  the  available  supply  of  the  risky  asset”  (Frydman  and  Goldberg,  
2010).  Here  the  risk  premium  is  related  to  how  far  the  exchange  rate  moves  in  
one  direction  or  the  other  relative  to  its  benchmark  of  Purchasing-­‐‑Power-­‐‑Parity  
(PPP).  
   John  Maynard  Keynes  in  The  General  Theory  of  Employment,  Interest  
and  Money,  gives  rise  to  the  nature  of  speculators  and  the  factors  influencing  
their  behavior,  “what  matters  is  not  the  absolute  level  of  [the  interest  rate]  r  but  
the  degree  of  its  divergence  from  what  is  considered  a  fairly  safe  [benchmark]  
level  of  r,  having  regard  to  those  calculations  of  probability  which  are  being  
relied  on”  (Keynes,  1936).  These  ideas  provide  the  foundation  for  Frydman  and  
Goldberg’s  gap  model.  “Keynes  discussion  of  the  importance  of  benchmark  
levels  as  anchors  for  asset  price  swings  suggests  that  market  participants  look  to  
the  gap  between  the  asset  price  and  its  benchmark  value  in  forecasting  the  
potential  unit  loss  from  speculation”  (Frydman  and  Goldberg,  2003).  Asset  price  
evaluation  in  reference  to  the  underlying  benchmark  value  typifies  investor  
behavior.  The  larger  the  gap,  the  greater  the  premium  the  investor  will  seek  to  
hold  the  risky  asset,  as  the  potential  for  loss  is  greater.    
   In  their  paper,  Frydman  and  Goldberg  observe  that  the  risk  premium  co-­‐‑
moves  with  PPP.  “Frydman  and  Goldberg  (2007)  and  Stillwagon  (2010)  
undertake  more  formal  statistical  analysis  using  parametric  and  nonparametric  
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procedures  and  find  a  positive  relationship  between  the  premium  and  the  gap  in  
the  three  largest  currency  markets”  (Frydman  and  Goldberg,  2010).  PPP  is  the  
level  of  relative  prices  that  the  exchange  rate  reverts  back  to  over  long  horizons.  
They  alternate  risk  perceptions  from  the  standard  utility  theory  and  incorporate  
Tversky  and  Kahneman’s  prospect  theory.  
   Prospect  theory  states  that  individuals’  risk  preferences  vary,  similar  to  
the  endogenous  prospect  theory  in  the  IKE  model.  Kahneman  and  Tversky  
(1992)  modeled  agents’  aversion  to  loss  is  from  a  proposed  utility  function,  below  
is  the  endogenous  prospect  theory:  
𝑉 ∆𝑊 = (𝑊 𝑎𝑟! )!−𝜆(𝑊 𝑎𝑟! )!  
This  utility  function  contains  dynamics  that  illustrate  individuals  as  loss  averse  
and  that  disutility  from  losses  is  greater  than  utility  from  equal  magnitude  gains.  
Gains  and  losses  are  shown  by  𝑟!and  𝑟!respectively.  The  𝜆  coefficient  is  the  
functions  constant.  The  utility  function  is  derived  from  agents’  open  stock  
positions  and  represents  fluctuations  in  financial  wealth.  This  is  important  as  this  
paper  weighs  the  potential  of  each  plausible  explanation  separately.  
   By  utilizing  the  prospect  theory  based  IKE  model,  allowing  for  structural  
change,  and  through  the  use  of  survey  data,  eliminating  the  need  to  specify  REH  
expectations,  this  paper  is  able  to  further  determine  whether  or  not  investors  are  
forming  forecasts  characterized  by  simple  behavioral  rules.  “But  we  use  an  
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extension  of  their  original  formulation,  which  we  call  endogenous  prospect  
theory,  that  recognizes  that  outcomes  cannot  be  represented  with  an  overarching  
probability  distribution”  (Frydman  and  Goldberg,  2010).  These  behaviors  have  
implications  for  individuals’  perceptions  of  risk  and  how  they  will  invest  in  the  
face  of  varying  degrees  of  risk.  The  intuition  is  that,  if  the  dollar  is  overvalued  
relative  to  PPP,  individuals  investing  in  the  dollar  demand  a  higher  expected  
return  to  compensate  for  the  risk  that  the  exchange  rate  may  reverse  back  
towards  PPP.  “There  is,  however  a  serious  problem  with  using  the  forward  
discount  as  the  measure  of  the  expected  change  in  the  exchange  rate,  in  that  the  
two  may  not  be  equal.  The  gap  that  may  separate  the  forward  discount  and  
expected  depreciation  is  generally  interpreted  as  a  risk  premium”  (Frankel  and  
Froot,  1990).  This  is  in  contrast  to  standard  models  where  volatility  provides  the  
perceived  level  of  risk.  “Purchasing  Power  Parity  (PPP)  has  variously  been  
viewed  as  a  theory  of  exchange  rate  determination,  as  a  short-­‐‑  or  long-­‐‑run  
equilibrium  condition,  and  as  an  efficient  arbitrage  condition  in  either  goods  or  
asset  markets  (Officer  1976;  Frenkel  1976,  1978;  Rudiger  Dornbusch  1987a)”  
(Taylor,  1995).  The  IKE  model  was  developed  specifically  to  look  at  risk.  “We  
show  that  opening  a  mathematical  model  to  non-­‐‑routine  change  and  imperfect  
knowledge  on  the  part  of  economists  enables  us  to  incorporate  both  fundamental  
variables  (such  as  earnings  and  interest  rates),  on  which  rational  expectations  
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(REH)  theorists  focus,  and  psychological  and  social  considerations  (such  as  
confidence  and  conventions),  which  behavioral  economists  emphasize,  without  
presuming  obvious  irrationality  on  the  part  of  market  participants”  (Frydman  
and  Goldberg,  2010).  In  their  paper  Opening  Models  of  Asset  Prices  and  Risk  to  Non-­‐‑
Routine  Change,  Frydman  and  Goldberg  develop  the  microfoundations  for  an  
Imperfect  Knowledge  Economics  model,  “an  IKE  model  that  can  account  for  the  
long-­‐‑swings  nature  of  fluctuations  in  asset  prices  and  risk  –  and  for  the  
connection  between  the  two  –  without  presuming  that  individuals  forego  
obvious  profits  opportunities”  (Frydman  and  Goldberg,  2010).  The  further  
overvalued  a  currency  is  from  PPP  the  greater  perceived  potential  for  loss.	  
Behavioral	  Rules:	  Representation	  Examined	    
Characterizations  of  expectations  
When  constructing  economic  models,  assumptions  must  be  made  to  simplify  the  
modeling  process.  Given  the  empirical  difficulties  of  UIP  we  must  also  take  into  
consideration  the  theory’s  assumptions  and  how  well  they  describe  market  
conditions  and  participants’  behavior.  UIP  assumes  that  in  international  financial  
market  agents  form  rational  expectations,  are  risk  neutral,  and  there  is  free  
capital  mobility.  At  the  time  of  development,  these  assumptions  may  have  
seemed  like  accurate  descriptors  of  actual  market  conditions.  Like  the  
assumptions  in  other  macroeconomic  models,  financial  market  participants  are  
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presented  as  rational,  calculating  and  logical  individuals  to  the  extent  that  they  
will  make  decisions  regarding  their  finances  in  their  best  interest.  Until  recently  
these  assumptions  were  acceptable  and  considered  the  best  way  to  model  agents’  
behavior  when  faced  with  the  complexity  and  uncertainty  of  the  foreign  
exchange  market.  As  John  Maynard  Keynes  noted  regarding  uncertainty:  
Or,  again,  the  expectation  of  life  is  only  slightly  uncertain.  Even  the  
weather  is  only  moderately  uncertain.  The  sense  in  which  I  am  
using  the  term  is  that  in  which  the  prospect  of  a  European  war  is  
uncertain,  or  the  price  of  copper  and  the  rate  of  interest  twenty  
years  hence,  or  the  obsolescence  of  a  new  invention,  or  the  position  
of  private  wealth-­‐‑owners  in  the  social  system  in  1970.  About  these  
matters  there  is  no  scientific  basis  on  which  to  form  any  calculable  
probability  whatever.  We  simply  do  not  know.  Nevertheless,  the  
necessity  for  action  and  for  decision  compels  us  as  practical  men  to  
do  our  best  to  overlook  this  awkward  fact  and  to  behave  exactly  as  
we  should  if  we  had  behind  us  a  good  Benthamite  calculation  of  a  
series  of  prospective  advantages  and  disadvantages,  each  
multiplied  by  its  appropriate  probability,  waiting  to  be  summed.”  
Where  there  is  so  much  uncertainty  what  are  we  to  do?  But  use  the  
knowledge  that  we  have  to  navigate  the  complexities  of  life  and  
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progress,  as  we  are  destined  to  do.  We  therefore  assume  that  other  
individuals  act  accordingly  and  use  the  knowledge  and  
understanding  they  have  and  that  presented  to  them  by  others  to  
similarly  navigate  the  uncertainty  present  in  their  own  life.  
(Keynes,  1936)  
Ignoring  the  importance  of  uncertainty  led  to  simplifying  assumptions  of  agent  
behavior.  Economics  differentiates  itself  from  other  social  sciences  in  the  
assumptions  it  makes  about  agents.  Kenneth  Froot  and  Richard  Thaler  note  this,  
“most  (all?)  behavior  can  be  explained  by  assuming  that  agents  have  stable,  well-­‐‑
defined  preferences  and  make  rational  choices  consistent  with  those  preferences  
in  markets  that  (eventually)  clear”  (Froot  and  Thaler,  1990).  Observing  agent  
behavior  within  the  market,  prior  to  making  assumptions  about  how  they  act,  
will  help  better  understand  their  preferences,  how  they  are  forming  their  
expectations  and  inevitably,  assumptions  more  closely  resembling  that  observed  
behavior.  “Investors  could  even  be  rational,  and  yet  make  repeated  mistakes  of  
the  kind  detected  here,  if  the  true  model  of  the  spot  process  is  evolving  over  
time”  (Frankel  and  Froot,  1989)  It  is  difficult  to  say  what  constitutes  rational  
behavior  or  not  as  there  is  no  metric  for  how  forecasters  should  be  forming  their  
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expectations.4  This  issue  of  structural  change  is  another  component  of  the  
Imperfect  Knowledge  Economics,  where  we  have  observed  that  past  events  are  
necessarily  an  accurate  predictor  of  future  events.  Frankel  and  Froot  examined  
differences  in  investors’  expectations  as  they  consistently  under  predicted  in  the  
70s  and  over  predicted  in  the  80s.  
   The  second  possible  explanation  for  the  Forward  Discount  Anomaly  that  
is  examined  in  this  paper  looks  to  see  if  investors  are  forming  expectations  that  
follow  specific  behavioral  rules.  
Another  suggested  explanation  of  anomalous  exchange  rate  
movements  is  the  widespread  influence  of  foreign  exchange  
analysts  who  do  not  base  their  predictions  on  economic  theory-­‐‑the  
fundamentals-­‐‑but  on  the  identification  of  supposedly  recurring  
patterns  in  graphs  of  exchange  rate  movements-­‐‑i.e.,  "ʺtechnical"ʺ  or  
"ʺchart"ʺ  analysts  (Charles  Goodhart  1988;  Frankel  and  Froot  1990a,  
1990b;  Allen  and  Taylor  1990).  Questionnaire  surveys  conducted  by  
the  Group  of  Thirty  (1985)  and  Taylor  and  Allen  (1992)  reveal  that  
extremely  high  proportions  of  traders  employ  technical  or  chartist  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  These	  behavioral	  rules	  may	  be	  rational	  ways	  to	  produce	  unbiased	  forecasts	  with	  minimum	  variance.	  Froot	  and	  Frankel	  (1989)	  examine	  these	  expectations	  to	  determine	  if	  there	  is	  bias.	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analysis,  especially  when  fore-­‐‑casting  over  shorter  horizons  
(Taylor,  1995).  
  These  techniques  can  be  very  influential  on  market  movements  as  discussed  
earlier  where  the  market  may  demonstrate  self-­‐‑fulfilling  expectations.  For  
instance  if  market  agents  expect  a  currency’s  depreciation  and  act  as  if  that  will  
be  reality,  it  is  likely  the  currency  will  depreciate  as  a  result.  “The  question  of  
what  mechanism  investors  use  to  form  expectations  is  of  interest  independent  of  
the  question  of  whether  these  mechanisms  are  rational,  that  is,  whether  they  
coincide  with  the  mathematical  expectation  of  the  actual  spot  process”  (Frankel  
and  Froot,  1989).  They  offer  three  different  rules  to  illustrate  different  ways  that  
expectations  are  formed:  adaptive,  regressive  and  extrapolative  expectations.  The  
adaptive  technique  implies  that  investors  are  adjusting  their  expectations  for  the  
next  period  based  on  whether  they  under  or  overestimated  the  current  period.  
The  regressive  technique  takes  more  of  a  fundamentalist  approach,  where  
investors  expect  values  to  return  to  their  fundamental  or  benchmark  value.  “’The  
Trend  is  your  friend’,  as  they  say  on  the  trading  floor”  (James,  2003).  This  
common  saying  on  the  trading  floor  most  aptly  describes  the  extrapolative  
expectations  where  the  previous  trend  is  extended  to  next  period.  If  the  currency  
has  been  depreciating,  investors  will  expect  it  to  continue  to  depreciate,  where  
the  expected  change  as  being  related  to  the  past  change.  Also,  commonly  
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described  as  bandwagon  expectations.  Specific  behavioral  rules  could  be  
illustrating  how  traders  generate  their  point  forecasts  of  returns.  This  paper  uses  
survey  data  to  test  whether  the  behavioral  rules  are  consistent  with  traders’  
forecasts,  both  at  an  aggregate  and  disaggregated  level.  
Methods  
Survey	  data	  
Until  recently  survey  data  has  not  been  available  for  economists  to  incorporate  
into  their  research  because  it  had  not  been  compiled.  There  have  now  been  a  fair  
number  of  survey  data  studies.  Previous  empirical  work  has  operated  on  the  
assumption  that  the  rational  expectations  hypothesis  is  true  for  all  tests  of  UIP  
and  other  risk  premium  models.  “A  problem  with  much  of  the  empirical  work  
on  possible  rationalizations  of  the  rejection  of  the  simple,  risk  neutral  efficient  
markets  hypothesis,  is  that  in  testing  one  leg  of  the  joint  hypothesis,  researchers  
typically  have  assumed  that  the  other  leg  is  true”(Taylor,  1995).  Survey  data  
provides  insight  into  investor  expectations  and  behaviors  in  financial  markets  
that  would  be  hard  sought  through  other  means.  “In  general,  the  overall  
conclusion  that  emerges  from  survey  data  studies  appears  to  be  that  both  risk  
aversion  and  departures  from  rational  expectations  are  responsible  for  rejection  
of  the  simple  efficient  markets  hypothesis”  (Taylor,  1995).  Through  survey  data,  
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this  paper  is  able  to  test  for  a  risk  premium  without  assuming  REH.  By  using  
historical  exchange  rate,  interest  rate,  and  survey  data  from  1982-­‐‑2000,  it  is  
possible  to  look  at  these  two  explanations  (risk  and  non-­‐‑REH  forecasting)  for  the  
Forward  Discount  Anomaly  individually.  Utilizing  survey  data  Frankel  and  
Froot  describe  investors’  expectations  formation  through  a  simple  model.  
With  Frankel  and  Froot’s  framework,  modeling  investors’  expectations  with  
survey  data  from  Money  Market  Services  International,  testing  whether  investors  
form  non-­‐‑REH  expectations  becomes  possible.  
Cointegrated	  VAR	  Model	  
A  cointegrated  vector  auto  regression  (VAR)  model  was  estimated  to  obtain  the  
results  analyzed  by  this  paper.  A  cointegrated  VAR  model  has  variables  that  are  
non-­‐‑stationary,  in  that  they  follow  a  random  walk,  but  can  still  be  combined  in  a  
linear  way  to  form  a  stationary  relationship.  This  relationship  can  be  interpreted  
as  equilibrium.  As  stated  by  Katarina  Juselius  (2006),  “  .  .  .  the  VAR  model  is  
essentially  a  reformulation  of  the  covariances  of  the  data.  The  question  is  
whether  it  can  be  interpreted  in  terms  of  rational  economic  behavior,  and  if  so,  
whether  it  could  be  used  as  a  ‘design  experiment’  when  data  are  collected  by  
passive  observation”  (Juselius,  2006).  In  addition  to  the  VAR  model’s  capabilities  
of  testing  more  than  one  potential  relationship,  the  model  can  be  modified  in  a  
manner  that  allows  for  a  statistically  ‘well-­‐‑behaved’  model  (Juselius,  2006).  For  
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analyzing  the  hypothesizes  that  this  paper  presents,  the  estimation  of  a  VAR  
model  provides  for  the  greatest  flexibility  for  deriving  results  and  therefore  more  
reliable  results  from  which  valuable  conclusions  can  be  drawn.  
   Cointegration  is  the  process  of  combining  two  or  more  non-­‐‑stationary  
variables  so  that  together  they  become  stationary.  “Cointegration  implies  that  
certain  linear  combinations  of  the  variables  of  the  vector  process  are  integrated  of  
lower  order  than  the  process  itself”  (Juselius,  2006).  This  suggests  that  the  only  
difference  could  be  white  noise  error  as  the  cointegrated  variables  are  influenced  
by  the  same  shocks.  “Thus,  if  the  non-­‐‑  stationarity  of  one  variable  corresponds  to  
the  non-­‐‑stationarity  of  another  variable,  then  there  exists  a  linear  combination  
between  them  that  becomes  stationary”  (Juselius,  2006).  Therefore  equilibrium  
between  two  variables  is  established  (co-­‐‑integrating  equilibrium),  as  two  or  more  
variables  that  have  common  stochastic  trends,  will  move  together  in  the  long  
run.  Katarina  Juselius  further  states  that  these  long-­‐‑run  economic  relationships  
are  of  a  “steady-­‐‑state”  and  “therefore  of  considerable  economic  interest”  
(Juselius,  2006).  Within  the  foreign  exchange  market,  this  has  significant  
implications  for  the  current  state  of  the  volatile  system,  as  there  is  an  observed  
tendency  of  exchange  rates  to  regress  back  to  the  fundamental  values  over  the  
long  run.  
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Sample	  
The  period:  1982-­‐‑2000  provides  for  interesting  analysis,  as  exchange  rates  were  
exceptionally  volatile  for  the  dollar  was  extremely  overvalued  in  the  early  80s  
and  was  then  persistently  undervalued  relative  to  its  benchmark  PPP  value  from  
the  mid  80s  onward.  See  Graph  2  
  
The  use  of  survey  data  of  investors’  forecasts  is  an  instrumental  aspect  of  this  
research,  allowing  investors’  behaviors  to  be  observed  through  their  exchange  
rate  expectations  and  allowing  various  hypotheses  about  how  they  form  their  
expectations  to  be  tested  individually.  The  question  becomes  whether  agents  are  
not  investing  in  the  country  with  the  higher  interest  rate  because  of  some  notion  
of  risk,  or  because  they  don’t  have  perfect  foresight  and  if  not,  then  what  rule  
best  describes  how  they  are  forming  their  expectations?  
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Description  of  Results  
Test	  UIP	  ex	  post	  
  This  paper  tests  the  Uncovered  Interest  Parity  ex  post  to  find  consistency  with  
previous  empirical  research  for  the  sample  of  Pound  Sterling/U.S.  Dollar  
exchange  rate  for  the  period  of  1982-­‐‑2000.  The  following  regression  was  
estimated  using  the  Cointegrated  Vector  Autoregression:  
Table	  1:	  UIP	  ex	  post	  -­‐	  Rejected	  
Bartlett	  Correction:	  CHiSqr	   0.132[0.716]	   	   	  
Variables	   Change	  in	  Exchange	  Rate	  
U.S.	  short	  term	  
interest	  rate	  from	  
the	  prior	  month	  
(lagged	  once)	  
	  
U.K.	  short	  term	  
interest	  rate	  from	  the	  




Beta	  Coefficient	   1.000	   -­‐2.422	   2.422	   -­‐0.005	  
t-­‐value	   n/a	   -­‐1.964	   1.964	   -­‐1.420	  
Alpha	  Coefficient	   -­‐0.922	   0	   0.001	   n/a	  
t-­‐value	   -­‐9.982	   0.144	   0.996	   n/a	  	   𝑠! − 𝑠!!! = 𝛾 + 𝛽 𝑖!!! − 𝑖!!!∗ + 𝜀!  𝑠!  is  the  current  spot  exchange  rate.  While,  𝑠!!!  is  the  previous  period’s  spot  rate.  
The  intercept  is  included  through  the  𝛾  value.  In  the  later  IKE  Gap  Model  and  
tests  of  UIP  ex  ante,  the  following  variables  will  also  be  included:  𝑠!!!|!!   is  the  
future  expected  exchange  rate.  The  current  spot  rate,  𝑠!,  and  interest  rate  
differential  𝑖∗ − 𝑖.  In  testing  UIP  ex  post,  the  interest  rates   𝑖!!! − 𝑖!!!∗ ,  domestic  
and  foreign,  were  imposed  to  have  the  same  coefficient.  Through  the  VAR  
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model,  a  system  of  equations,  multiple  endogenous  variables  are  allowed  
simultaneously.  
In  this  research  only  one  cointegrating  relationship  has  been  found.  The  Roots  of  
Companion  Matrix  helped  in  determining  the  rank  of  one  so  there  were  2  near  
unit  roots  in  this  system  of  three  variables.  UIP  predicts  a  coefficient  of  one  so  the  
interest  rates  differential  is  offset  by  a  future  change  in  the  exchange  rate  on  
average.  Further,  in  this  estimated  model,  there  was  not  a  need  for  intervention  
dummy  variables  to  account  for  significant  economic  or  political  events.  
   The  rejection  of  UIP  ex  post  confirmed  what  previous  research  found  and  
gives  rise  to  the  Forward  Discount  Anomaly,  since  both  interest  rates  were  
imposed  to  have  the  same  coefficient.  The  estimated  coefficient  of  β,  -­‐‑  2.242,  was  
found  to  be  significant  with  a  t-­‐‑value  of  -­‐‑1.964.  This  finding  is  consistent  with  
previous  literature’s  rejection  of  the  UIP  ex  post,  as  the  theory’s  conditions  require  
a  γ  of  0  and  a  β  at  unity.    
Testing	  UIP	  ex	  ante	  
Table	  2:	  UIP	  ex	  ante	  -­‐	  Rejected	  
Bartlett	  Correction:	  CHiSqr	   8.451[0.038]	  
  
Next,  UIP  ex  ante  is  tested  with  survey  data.  If  rejected,  this  would  imply  a  
premium  but  if  upheld  would  show  that  expected  returns  equalize.  Rejection  
suggests  that  the  Forward  Discount  Anomaly  exists  just  because  investors  
	  	   47	  
systematically  mis-­‐‑forecast.  Therefore  a  gross  market  inefficiency.  The  following  
regression  model  was  estimated:  𝑠!!!|!! − 𝑠! = 𝑖 − 𝑖∗  
Using  cointegrated  vector  autoregression  this  paper  rejects  UIP  ex  ante  with  the  
survey  data  where  difference  in  the  future  expected  exchange  rate  with  the  
current  spot  rate  should  be  offset  by  the  interest  rate  differential  𝑖 − 𝑖∗.  Rejection  
of  UIP  ex  ante  suggests  a  premium  and  provides  sufficient  evidence  for  
investigating  a  model  that  re-­‐‑evaluates  how  market  agents  perceive  risk.  With  a  
sufficiently  small  p-­‐‑value  of  0.038  this  allows  for  the  rejection  of  the  
Cointegration  or  stationarity  hypothesis.  This  estimated  model  would  then  
suggest  that  there  is  a  risk  premium.  This  premium  could  therefore  partially  
account  for  the  Forward  Discount  Anomaly,  as  investors  are  less  likely  to  invest  
in  the  country  with  higher  interest  rate  due  to  greater  risk  associated  with  that  
investment.  Without  this  counter  balancing  effect  driving  down  the  exchange  
rate  to  offset  the  interest  rate  differential,  returns  therefore  do  not  equalize.  
Imperfect	  Knowledge	  Economics:	  Gap	  model	  
The  estimated  equation  contains  the  risk  premium,  which  includes:  the  future  
expected  exchange  rate,  U.S.  and  U.K.  interest  rates,  as  the  left  hand  side  
variables  of  the  model.  These  results  show  the  extent  of  error  correction  through  
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the  alpha  coefficient,  where  the  variables  are  adjusting  back  to  equilibrium.  
These  values  need  to  be  significant  to  make  up  for  the  disequilibrium.  
Table	  3:	  IKE	  Gap	  Model	  
Bartlett	  Correction:	  CHiSqr	   0.638[0.727]	   	   	   	  
Variables	   Exchange	  Rate	   U.S.	  10	  year	  
government	  
bond	  
U.K.	  10	  year	  
government	  
bond	  
GAP	   Constant	  
Beta	  Coefficient	   1.000	   1.000	   -­‐1.000	   1.892	   0.002	  
t-­‐values	   n/a	   n/a	   n/a	   2.329	   2.284	  
Alpha	  Coefficient	   -­‐0.443	   -­‐0.006	   -­‐0.001	   -­‐0.001	   n/a	  
t-­‐values	   -­‐6.485	   -­‐2.539	   -­‐0.566	   -­‐0.406	   n/a	  
With  the  confirmation  of  the  possibility  of  a  risk  premium,  in  accordance  with  
the  beliefs  of  Keynes  that  gave  rise  to  the  Imperfect  Knowledge  Economics  Gap  
Model  of  Frydman  and  Goldberg,  the  following  regression  is  estimated  to  
determine  the  validity  of  the  IKE  Gap  model  given  the  sample.  𝑠!!!|!! − 𝑠! + 𝑖∗ − 𝑖 = 𝛽(𝑠! − 𝑠!!!!)  
The  cointegrated  vector  autoregression  yields  a  beta  coefficient  for  the  gap:  (𝑠! − 𝑠!!!!)  of  1.892,  significant  with  a  t-­‐‑value  of  2.329.  Where,  𝑠!!!|!!   is  the  future  
expected  exchange  rate.  The  current  spot  rate,  𝑠!,  the  interest  rate  differential  𝑖∗ − 𝑖  and  Purchasing-­‐‑Power-­‐‑Parity,  𝑠!!!!.  This  estimation  has  a  p-­‐‑value  of  0.727,  
we  therefore  do  not  reject  the  stationarity  hypothesis.  The  Gap  Model  was  
normalized  on  the  expected  change  in  the  exchange  rate  and  imposed  an  equal  
coefficient  restriction.  As  previously  mentioned  the  risk  premium  is  defined  as  
the  expected  excess  returns  series.  Suggested  by  Frydman  and  Goldberg,  this  
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series  shows  the  real  exchange  rate  to  co-­‐‑move  with  a  measure  of  the  risk  
premium.  Looking  at  the  data  visually  allows  us  to  see  this  relationship  as  
predicted  by  the  Imperfect  Knowledge  Economics  gap  model.  The  graph  below  
shows  that  the  risk  premium  tends  to  move  positively  with  this  real  exchange  
rate  (See  Graph  3).  
	  Graph  3  
	  
In  black  is  the  measure  of  the  risk  premium  based  in  part  on  survey  data.  It  moves  in  a  
positive  manner  with  the  difference  between  the  exchange  rate  and  its  benchmark  value  of  
PPP.  
   The  spot  exchange  rate  has  an  alpha  coefficient  of  -­‐‑0.443  and  a  significant  
t-­‐‑value,  therefore  making  up  for  44%  of  the  disequilibrium  in  each  period.  The  
U.S.  interest  rates  are  precisely  estimated  but  very  small  while  the  U.K.  interest  
rates  are  insignificant.  The  U.S.  interest  rates’  alpha  coefficients  are  not  large  
enough  to  contribute  significantly  in  making  up  the  disequilibrium.  When  the  
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exchange  rate  is  overvalued  relative  to  PPP,  individuals  investing  in  it  become  
worried  about  an  eventual  reversal  and  require  a  higher  expected  return  to  
maintain  their  position  in  that  currency.  This  seems  to  make  sense  since  there  is  a  
tendency  for  exchange  rates  to  mean  revert  back  to  PPP  over  very  long  horizons.  
   The  IKE  Gap  Model  gains  further  support  from  this  paper  as  the  estimate  
for  GAP  coefficient  and  overall  model  are  found  to  be  significant.  The  estimated  
regression  shows  that  expected  effect  of  varying  degrees  of  risk,  derived  from  a  
gap  between  the  PPP  value  and  current  spot  exchange  rate,  may  lead  to  
investment  and  profit  opportunities  foregone.  These  realized  risks  in  the  
prospective  investment  may  have  an  effect  on  investor  decisions  and  therefore  
become  a  plausible  explanation  for  the  Forward  Discount  Anomaly.    
Expectations	  
As  the  Forward  Discount  Anomaly  seems  to  suggest  investors  forego  obvious  
profits.  The  existence  of  a  risk  premium  may  partially  explain  this  behavior.  The  
next  potential  explanation  that  this  paper  examines  is  if  investors  are  forming  
expectations  consistent  with  simple  behavioral  rules.  If  investors  utilize  these  
rules  they  may  be  simplifying  overly  complex  investment  decisions  as  suggested  
by  DeGrauwe  and  Grimaldi  and  Frankel  and  Froot.  These  processes  involved  
may  comprise  the  final  decision  and  lead  to  a  non-­‐‑optimal  outcome.  
Emphasizing  the  need  to  understand  what  is  influencing  investor  behavior  and  
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why  they  may  forego  profits.  Analysis  of  survey  data  confirms  consistency  with  
investor  expectations  and  simple  behavioral  rules  formulated  by  Froot  and  
Frankel  (1989).  
Adaptive  
One  of  the  behavioral  rules  discussed  by  Frankel  and  Froot  in  their  1989  paper  is  
the  adaptive  expectation  formed  by  investors.  Adaptive  expectations  modifies  
projections  of  the  expected  future  spot  rate  through  a  process  using  the  weighted  
average  of  the  current  spot  rate  and  the  lagged  expected  rate:  𝑠!!!|!! = 1− 𝛾! 𝑠! + 𝛾!𝑠!|!!!! .  
where  the  future  expected  exchange  rate,  𝑠!!!|!! ,  is  formulated  adaptively.  This  
technique  implies  that  investors  are  adjusting  their  expectations  for  the  next  
period  based  on  whether  they  under  or  overestimated  the  current  period.  The  
value  of  𝛾!  is  expected  to  between  0  and  1,  indicating  that  the  expectations  are  
inelastic.  This  paper’s  results,  provide  strong  support  that  individuals  are  
adjusting  in  what  looks  like  an  adaptive  fashion,  so  if  they  underestimate  the  
exchange  rate,  they  increase  their  expectation  for  the  next  period.  Though  at  
times  it  appears  to  also  be  extrapolative,  so  their  expectation  increases  more  than  
one  to  compensate  for  the  forecast  error  (suggesting  investors  expect  a  trending  
exchange  rate).  
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   The  estimate  of  the  adaptive  parameter  is  the  expected  exchange  rate  
divided  by  the  forecast  error.  Sorting  this  value,  the  adaptive  parameter  a,  by  the  
absolute  value  of  the  forecast  error’s  magnitude,  it  is  apparent  that  the  adaptive  
technique  was  used  for  the  vast  majority  of  estimates.  Only  where  the  error  was  
small  did  it  appear  that  other  techniques  were  used.  See  Graph  4
  
This  graphical  analysis  shows  a  clear  depiction  that  investors  are  forming  their  
expectations  adaptively.  When  looking  at  the  correlation  between  the  
independent  variables,  this  paper  found  that  a  correlation  of  .95  between  the  
forecast  error  and  expected  change  in  the  exchange  rate,  which  further  validates  
the  conclusion  that  investors  are  forming  expectations  consistent  with  simple  
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   This  technique  could  indicate  various  implications  for  market  movements.  
Psychological  literature  talks  of  conservatism  in  approaching  markets  that  may  
make  investors  reluctant  to  over  extend  their  expectations  even  when  they  are  
systematically  under  or  over  forecasting.  This  hesitation  may  indicate  extreme  
loss  aversion  in  financial  markets  by  investors  and  their  continuing  inability  to  
correctly  forecast  may  make  them  reluctant  to  commit  further.  This  would  be  in  
accordance  with  the  value  function  of  Kahneman  and  Tversky’s  prospect  theory.  
   Systematic  mis-­‐‑forecasting  and  other  possible  explanations  could  account  
for  this  inability  and  foregone  profits  in  international  financial  markets.  Finding  
consistency  with  behavioral  rules  provides  greater  insight  and  understanding  
into  how  investors  are  forming  their  expectations,  given  the  market  uncertainty  
they  face.  
Regressive  
Another  technique  outlined  by  Frankel  and  Froot  is  the  regressive  technique  
where  investors’  expectations  are  regressive  back  to  PPP,  consistent  with  
standard  theory.  This  regressive  technique  has  also  been  coined  the  
“fundamentalist  approach”  where  investors  expected  underlying  fundamental  
values  to  drive  asset  prices  and  implies  a  negative  correlation  between  the  
expected  rate  and  real  exchange  rate.  Rudiger  Dornbusch  was  a  proponent  of  
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this  technique;  it  suggests  that  values  and  prices  converge  on  long-­‐‑run  
equilibriums  (Frankel  and  Froot,  1989).  𝑠!!!! = 1− 𝜗 𝑠! + 𝜗𝑠!  
where  𝑠!  is  the  long  run  equilibrium  and  𝜗  is  the  speed  at  which  regression  is  
expected  to  occur.  When  observing  the  survey  data  it  only  appears  to  be  true  that  
when  the  gap  is  very  large  in  absolute  value  terms.  This  paper  models  the  below  
regressive  technique:   ∆𝑠!!!! = 𝑐(𝑠! − 𝑠!!!)  
illustrating  Purchasing-­‐‑Power-­‐‑Parity  as  𝑠!!!.  Investors’  expectations  grow  more  
regressive  as  they  expect  there  to  be  movement  back  to  fundamental  values.  
Therefore  as  the  real  exchange  rate,  𝑠! − 𝑠!!!  grows;  investors  expect  the  future  
exchange  rate  to  move  back  to  the  benchmark  PPP  value.  This  is  shown  in  Graph  
5.  
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This  graph  shows  the  regressive  parameter,  c,  sorted  by  the  size  of  the  gap.  The  
regressive  parameter  is  the  expected  change  in  the  exchange  rate  over  the  real  
exchange  rate  (the  current  spot  minus  the  PPP  value).  The  graph  shows  that  as  
the  gap  between  the  exchange  rate  and  the  benchmark  value  at  PPP  grows,  
investors  become  more  regressive.  Through  sorting  by  the  absolute  value  of  the  
gap  we  were  able  to  see  that  investors’  behavior  became  increasingly  regressive,  
as  the  gap  grew  larger.  Additional,  analysis  shows  that  the  correlation  between  
dependent  variables  for  the  formation  of  regressive  techniques  is  36%.  There  is,  
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and  the  real  exchange  rate  when  the  gap  is  sufficiently  large.  The  regressive  
techniques  effectiveness  is  when  the  gap  is  large,  but  overall  agents  expect  a  
further  movement  away  from  fundamentals.  
Extrapolative  
The  third  behavioral  rule  that  was  tested  to  see  if  was  implemented  on  the  
aggregate  level  in  the  survey  data  from  MMSI,  was  the  extrapolative  technique.  
This  is  the  technique  illustrated  by  Frankel  and  Froot:	  ∆𝑠!!!! = −𝑔∆𝑠!	  
where  investors  are  shown  to  have  static  expectations  if  g=0,  but  otherwise  g  is  
hypothesized  to  be  less  than  zero.  The  above  model  is  similar  to  what  DeGrauwe  
and  Grimaldi  (2006)  specify  to  model  chartists,  who  are  suggested  to  use  an  
extrapolative  technique:   𝐸!,! ∆𝑠!!! = 𝛽∆𝑠!  
where  the  𝛽  coefficient  is  the  degree  to  which  they  extrapolate  the  expected  
change  for  the  future  expected  exchange  rate.  The  extrapolative  technique  
proposes  that  investors  expect  change  in  the  future  expected  exchange  rate,  s!!!! ,  
to  be  the  most  recent  observed  change  of  the  spot  exchange  rate,  s!.  These  
investors  are  described  as  chartists  and  often  display  bandwagon  expectations.  
This  behavioral  rule  had  the  lowest  correlation  of  the  three  rules  -­‐‑0.037.  The  
correlation  was  calculated  from  the  variables  of  the  difference  between  the  
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survey  data  of  investor’s  expectation  for  the  future  exchange  rate  with  the  actual  
spot  rate  at  that  time  period  and  the  actual  change  from  current  to  future  spot  
rate.  For  the  sample  of  aggregate  survey  data,  investors’  expectations  were  not  
consistent  with  the  extrapolative  technique,  and  therefore  it  does  not  seem  to  
characterize  their  behavior  well.  	  
   The  graph  below  (Graph  6),  shows  no  real  consistency  in  one  direction  or  
another  for  the  extrapolative  parameter  for  one  month  intervals.  Also  for  three,  
six,  nine  and  twelve-­‐‑month  intervals  were  found  to  be  inconsistent  as  well.  Graph  
6  shows  the  extrapolative  parameter,  g,  sorted  by  the  absolute  value  of  the  actual  
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The  extrapolative  technique  does  not  appear  to  be  implemented  by  investors  
according  to  the  sample  examined.  This  technique  is  thought  to  also  be  the  most  
disruptive  of  the  three  in  the  foreign  exchange  market:	  
The  finding  that  a  high  proportion  of  foreign  exchange  market  
participants  deliberately  use  analytical  techniques  that  ignore  macro  
fundamentals  (i.e.  ‘technical  or  ‘chartist’  analysis)  especially  over  
shorter  horizons  .  .  .  underscores  the  importance  of  allowing  for  the  
interaction  of  diverse  forces  in  the  short  run  determination  of  
exchange  rates  (Flood  and  Taylor,  1996)	  
Flood  and  Taylor  (1996)  were  compelled  by  the  findings  in  survey  data  that  
showed  investors  having  heterogeneous  expectations  that  are  consistent  with  
behavioral  rules.  Employing  simple  behavioral  rules  for  dealing  with  the  
complexity  of  markets  seems  a  reasonable  approach.  
   This  research  looked  for  consistency  between  the  survey  data  and  the  
rules  underlying  three  particular  techniques:  adaptive,  extrapolative  and  
regressive.  The  results  showed  that  investors  for  our  sample  were  best  described  
by  the  adaptive  expectations  at  a  95%  correlation.  But  when  the  gap  between  the  
underlying  fundamentals  and  the  spot  exchange  rate  is  large,  investors  were  
100%  regressive.  Showing  consistency  between  simple  behavioral  rules  and  this  
sample  of  survey  data.  
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   Along  with  the  aggregate  survey  data  from  MMSI,  Bloomberg  has  collected  
individual  survey  data  for  a  number  of  banks  (Credit  Suisse  Group,  Morgan  
Stanley,  UBS  to  name  a  few).  The  survey  of  expectations  for  the  individual  banks  
suggest  that  from  the  third  quarter  of  2006  to  the  second  quarter  of  2014  banks  
are  showing  very  regressive  expectations.  The  average  of  the  calculated  PPP  
value  for  this  period  is  0.6253  and  the  average  actual  exchange  rate  is  1.688.  With  
a  sufficiently  large  gap  between  the  benchmark  and  spot  exchange  rate,  this  is  
consistent  with  the  aggregate  data,  as  now  individual  banks  appear  to  be  
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   The  above  graph  (Graph  7)  shows  the  median  estimate  of  29  banks  that  
submitted  their  quarterly  estimates  to  Bloomberg  compared  with  the  quarter  
average  exchange  rate  and  PPP  value.  The  calculated  average  of  the  correlation  
for  the  regressive  techniques  variables  was  -­‐‑98.8%.  Similar  to  the  aggregate  data,  
the  individual  forecasts  of  29  banks  (a  few  the  major  players  in  the  foreign  
exchange  market)  are  also  consistent  with  simple  behavioral  rules  at  this  time  
period,  which  shows  a  large  gap  between  the  PPP  value  and  exchange  rate.  
   Frankel  and  Froot’s  (1989)  paper  suggests  avenues  for  future  economic  
research.  “We  believe  that  heterogeneous  expectations  and  their  role  in  
determining  market  dynamics  are  important  areas  for  future  research”  (Frankel  
and  Froot,  1989).  They  also  state  that,  “If  expectations  are  heterogeneous,  then  
the  forward  discount  that  is  determined  in  market  equilibrium  could  be  a  convex  
combination  of  regressive  expectations  and  other  forecasts  that  are  closer  to  static  
expectations”  (Frankel  and  Froot,  1987).  Frankel  and  Froot  (1987)  claim  that  
people  utilize  different  techniques  at  the  same  time.  The  results  from  this  paper  
show  situations  where  investors  are  100%  regressive  with  a  large  gap  but  most  
other  times  adaptive,  and  sometimes  extrapolatively  adaptive.  
   The  consistency  with  behavioral  rules  provides  greater  insight  into  
investor  behavior.  This  understanding  helps  to  provide  a  piece  of  the  puzzle  in  
trying  to  determine  what  drives  currency  returns  and  why  investors  behave  the  
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way  they  do.  The  Forward  Discount  Anomaly  and  extreme  volatility  in  the  short  
run  remains  unexplained  and  it  is  only  a  matter  of  incorporating  the  right  
elements  to  gain  further  insight.  This  paper  presents  further  evidence  in  support  
of  adjusting  current  assumptions  and  incorporating  more  salient  
characterizations  of  human  behavior.  Further,  through  a  cointegrated  vector  
autoregression,  the  estimated  model  shows  that  there  is  a  risk  premium  related  
to  the  gap,  as  investors  require  more  for  holding  higher  risk  assets.  
   The  findings  of  this  paper  emphasize  the  need  for  new  techniques  for  
evaluating  market  outcomes  that  better  incorporate  investor  behavior,  their  
perceptions  on  risk  and  the  simplifying  techniques  they  employ  in  the  face  of  
complexity  and  uncertainty.  
Conclusion  
There  are  many  anomalies  that  persist  in  macroeconomics,  challenging  economic  
theory.  These  puzzles  expose  economic  theories’  inability  to  accurately  depicted  
market  outcomes.  The  Forward  Discount  Anomaly  is  one  such  puzzle  that  
persists  in  the  foreign  exchange  market.  Gaining  insight  into  the  foreign  
exchange  market  is  crucial  as  international  agents  hope  to  navigate  uncertainty  
presented  by  fluctuating  exchange  rates.  This  paper  provides  evidence  that  
suggests  that  there  is  a  premium  in  the  foreign  exchange  market.  Regression  
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analysis  supports  the  IKE  Gap  model  that  further  implies  that  it  may  be  a  risk  
premium  associated  with  a  large  gap  between  the  PPP  value  and  spot  rate.  This  
contradicts  an  assumption  that  is  used  in  the  Uncovered  Interest  Rate  Parity  
theory  where  investors  are  believed  to  be  risk  neutral  and  when  evaluating  
potential  investments  they  will  go  for  the  higher  return  regardless  of  risk.  In  
addition,  survey  data  shows  that  investors’  expectations  are  consistent  with  
certain  behavioral  rules.  This  paper’s  findings  provide  one  more  piece  of  the  
puzzle  and  urges  the  need  to  re-­‐‑evaluate  assumptions  used  in  current  economic  
modeling.  Especially  those  models  based  on  expected  utility  theory  proposing  
economic  agents  as  calculating  individuals,  who  use  all  the  given  information  
available  and  have  consistent  risk  preferences.  In  an  increasingly  globalized  
community  more  accurate  modeling  can  reduce  uncertainty  by  providing  insight  
into  foreign  exchange  market  conditions,  thereby,  providing  firms  and  policy  
makers  a  better  understanding  of  what  drives  currency  returns.  Allowing  
international  agents  to  effectively  mitigate  risks  inherent  in  international  
exchange.  
Contribution  
The  results  presented  in  this  research  will  provide  further  insight  into  currency  
returns  and  moments  in  the  foreign  exchange  market  through  the  investigation  
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of  investors’  expectations.  Findings  showed  consistency  with  simple  behavioral  
rules.  While  there  must  be  further  investigation  into  possible  bias  in  these  
methods,  investor  adherence  to  simple  rules  is  one  of  many  pieces  needed  to  
progress  and  construct  better  rules  illustrating  agents’  expectation  formation.  
Further,  this  paper  provides  support  for  the  prospect  theory  based  Imperfect  
Knowledge  Gap  Model  and  the  need  to  seek  alternative  assumptions  for  
individuals’  risk  preferences  rather  than  assuming  risk  neutrality.  
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Appendix  
MODEL SUMMARY: UIP ex post 
Sample:                      1983:01 to 2000:09 (213 
observations) 
Effective Sample:            1983:03 to 2000:09 (211 
observations) 
Obs. - No. of variables:     193 
System variables:            DSPOT LAGIUS LAGIUK 
Constant/Trend:              Restricted Constant 
No. of Centered Seasonals:   12 
Lags in VAR:                 2 
 
The unrestricted estimates: 
BETA(transposed) 
         DSPOT   LAGIUS   LAGIUK  CONSTANT 
Beta(1) -43.686  128.308 -104.105    0.070 
Beta(2)   1.897  631.284 -501.231    0.091 
Beta(3)  -0.483 -406.526 -167.543    3.512 
 
ALPHA 
       Alpha(1) Alpha(2) Alpha(3) 
DDSPOT   0.021   -0.000    0.000 
        (9.980) (-0.191)  (0.229) 
DLAGIU  -0.000    0.000    0.000 
       (-0.234)  (1.157)  (2.489) 
DLAGIU  -0.000    0.000   -0.000 
       (-0.976)  (3.544) (-0.378) 
 
PI 
        DSPOT    LAGIUS   LAGIUK  CONSTANT 
DDSPOT  -0.923    2.256   -2.076    0.003 
       (-9.981)  (1.400) (-1.823)  (0.422) 
DLAGIU   0.000   -0.005   -0.016    0.000 
        (0.256) (-0.409) (-1.806)  (2.514) 
DLAGIU   0.001    0.056   -0.040   -0.000 
        (1.133)  (2.975) (-2.992) (-0.305) 
 




Residual S.E. and Cross-Correlations 
          DDSPOT    DLAGIUS    DLAGIUK 
         0.0307196  0.0002315  0.0003591 
DDSPOT    1.000 
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DLAGIUS   0.042      1.000 
DLAGIUK   -0.162     0.183      1.000 
 
 
LOG(|Sigma|)                      = -39.638 
Information Criteria: SC          = -38.268 
                      H-Q         = -38.779 
Trace Correlation                 =   0.302 
 
Tests for Autocorrelation 
Ljung-Box(52):        ChiSqr(450) = 653.427 [0.000] 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(9)   =  15.543 [0.077] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(9)   =   6.445 [0.695] 
 
Test for Normality:   ChiSqr(6)   =  80.433 [0.000] 
 
Test for ARCH: 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(36)  = 149.873 [0.000] 





        Mean   Std.Dev Skewness Kurtosis Maximum Minimum 
DDSPOT   0.000  0.031     0.317   5.405    0.141  -0.117 
DLAGIUS -0.000  0.000    -0.044   4.165    0.001  -0.001 
DLAGIUK -0.000  0.000     0.329   5.782    0.001  -0.001 
 
        ARCH(2)         Normality          R-Squared 
DDSPOT   9.906 [0.007]   33.652  [0.000]   0.505 
DLAGIUS 31.070 [0.000]   12.495  [0.002]   0.194 
DLAGIUK 11.784 [0.003]   41.595  [0.000]   0.193 
 
 
The Roots of Companion matrix helps to determine the rank, 
which shows how many cointegrating relationships there are 
between the variables, and allows for an easy calculation 
of the unit root. Further it helped in the selection of a 
system with rank r and p variables has p-r near unit roots. 
 
The Roots of the COMPANION MATRIX // Model: H(0) 
       Real  Imaginary Modulus Argument 
Root1  1.000     0.000   1.000    0.000 
Root2  1.000     0.000   1.000    0.000 
Root3  1.000     0.000   1.000    0.000 
Root4 -0.462     0.000   0.462    3.142 
Root5  0.271     0.040   0.274    0.148 
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Root6  0.271    -0.040   0.274   -0.148 
 
The Roots of the COMPANION MATRIX // Model: H(1) 
       Real  Imaginary Modulus Argument 
Root1  1.000     0.000   1.000    0.000 
Root2  1.000    -0.000   1.000   -0.000 
Root3  0.290     0.118   0.313    0.386 
Root4  0.290    -0.118   0.313   -0.386 
Root5  0.116    -0.000   0.116   -0.000 
Root6 -0.078     0.000   0.078    3.142 
 
The Roots of the COMPANION MATRIX // Model: H(2) 
       Real  Imaginary Modulus Argument 
Root1  1.000     0.000   1.000    0.000 
Root2  0.966     0.000   0.966    0.000 
Root3  0.281    -0.158   0.322   -0.511 
Root4  0.281     0.158   0.322    0.511 
Root5  0.110     0.000   0.110    0.000 
Root6 -0.078     0.000   0.078    3.142 
 
The Roots of the COMPANION MATRIX // Model: H(3) 
       Real  Imaginary Modulus Argument 
Root1  0.976    -0.037   0.977   -0.038 
Root2  0.976     0.037   0.977    0.038 
Root3  0.281    -0.169   0.328   -0.542 
Root4  0.281     0.169   0.328    0.542 
Root5  0.07I(1)-ANALYSIS 
 p-r r Eig.Value  Trace  Trace* Frac95 P-Value P-Value* 
  3  0     0.323 101.675 99.176 35.070   0.000    0.000 
  2  1     0.058  19.375 18.990 20.164   0.065    0.073 
  1  2     0.032   6.805  5.674  9.142   0.141     
RE-NORMALIZATION OF THE EIGENVECTORS: 
 
THE EIGENVECTOR(s)(transposed) 
         DSPOT  LAGIUS   LAGIUK  CONSTANT 
Beta(1) -43.686 128.308 -104.105    0.070 
 
PI 
        DSPOT    LAGIUS   LAGIUK  CONSTANT 
DDSPOT  -0.922    2.708   -2.197    0.001 
       (-9.978)  (9.978) (-9.978)  (9.978) 
DLAGIU   0.000   -0.000    0.000   -0.000 
        (0.230) (-0.230)  (0.230) (-0.230) 
DLAGIU   0.001   -0.003    0.003   -0.000 
        (0.948) (-0.948)  (0.948) (-0.948) 
 
Log-Likelihood = 4172.078 




8    -0.000   0.078   -0.000 
Root6 -0.065    -0.000   0.065   -3.142 
TEST OF RESTRICTED MODEL:    CHISQR(1) = 0.152 [0.696] 
BARTLETT CORRECTION:         CHISQR(1) = 0.132 [0.716] 
(Correction Factor: 1.154) 
 
RE-NORMALIZATION OF THE EIGENVECTORS: 
 
THE EIGENVECTOR(s)(transposed) 
        DSPOT   LAGIUS  LAGIUK  CONSTANT 
Beta(1) 43.688 -105.793 105.793   -0.210 
 
 
THE MATRICES BASED ON 1 COINTEGRATING VECTOR: 
 
BETA(transposed) 
        DSPOT  LAGIUS  LAGIUK  CONSTANT 
Beta(1) 1.000  -2.422   2.422   -0.005 
        (.NA) (-1.964) (1.964) (-1.420) 
 
The alpha values show the degree to which the variable is 
error correcting, provided a significant t-value. If the 
Beta and Alpha have opposite signs then the variable is 




       Alpha(1) 
DDSPOT  -0.922 
       (-9.982) 
DLAGIU   0.000 
        (0.144) 
DLAGIU   0.001 
        (0.996) 
 
PI 
        DSPOT    LAGIUS   LAGIUK  CONSTANT 
DDSPOT  -0.922    2.234   -2.234    0.004 
       (-9.982)  (9.982) (-9.982)  (9.982) 
DLAGIU   0.000   -0.000    0.000   -0.000 
        (0.144) (-0.144)  (0.144) (-0.144) 
DLAGIU   0.001   -0.003    0.003   -0.000 
        (0.996) (-0.996)  (0.996) (-0.996) 
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Log-Likelihood = 4172.001 
TEST OF RESTRICTED MODEL:    CHISQR(3) = 6.690 [0.082] 
BARTLETT CORRECTION:         CHISQR(3) = 5.923 [0.115] 
(Correction Factor: 1.130) 
 
The p-value is the test of the restricted model. The model 
is rejected if the p-value is below .05. 
 
RE-NORMALIZATION OF THE EIGENVECTORS: 
 
THE EIGENVECTOR(s)(transposed) 
        DSPOT  LAGIUS LAGIUK  CONSTANT 
Beta(1) 42.392 42.392 -42.392    0.000 
 
 
THE MATRICES BASED ON 1 COINTEGRATING VECTOR: 
 
BETA(transposed) 
        DSPOT LAGIUS LAGIUK CONSTANT 
Beta(1) 1.000  1.000 -1.000    0.000 
        (.NA)  (.NA)  (.NA)    (.NA) 
 
ALPHA 
       Alpha(1) 
DDSPOT  -0.862 
       (-9.449) 
DLAGIU   0.000 
        (0.602) 
DLAGIU   0.002 
        (1.885) 
 
PI 
        DSPOT    LAGIUS   LAGIUK  CONSTANT 
DDSPOT  -0.862   -0.862    0.862     0.000 
       (-9.449) (-9.449)  (9.449)    (.NA) 
DLAGIU   0.000    0.000   -0.000     0.000 
        (0.602)  (0.602) (-0.602)    (.NA) 
DLAGIU   0.002    0.002   -0.002     0.000 
        (1.885)  (1.885) (-1.885)    (.NA) 
 
Log-Likelihood = 4168.733 
 
MODEL SUMMARY: UIP ex ante 
Sample:                      1982:12 to 2000:09 (214 
observations) 
Effective Sample:            1983:02 to 2000:09 (212 
observations) 
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Obs. - No. of variables:     194 
System variables:            EXDSPOT IUS IUK 
Constant/Trend:              Restricted Constant 
No. of Centered Seasonals:   12 
Lags in VAR:                 2 
 
 
The unrestricted estimates: 
BETA(transposed) 
        EXDSPOT    IUS      IUK    CONSTANT 
Beta(1) -124.189    0.930 -102.143    1.206 
Beta(2)  -16.371 -710.772  449.946    0.804 
Beta(3)   24.363 -262.221 -258.352    3.235 
 
ALPHA 
       Alpha(1) Alpha(2) Alpha(3) 
DEXDSP   0.003    0.000   -0.001 
        (6.048)  (0.488) (-1.363) 
DIUS     0.000   -0.000    0.000 
        (3.879) (-0.113)  (2.071) 
DIUK     0.000   -0.000    0.000 
        (1.307) (-3.351)  (0.153) 
 
PI 
       EXDSPOT    IUS      IUK    CONSTANT 
DEXDSP  -0.409    0.008   -0.024    0.002 
       (-6.208)  (0.022) (-0.087)  (0.924) 
DIUS    -0.007   -0.007   -0.015    0.000 
       (-3.366) (-0.606) (-1.857)  (3.184) 
DIUK    -0.003    0.058   -0.041   -0.000 
       (-0.813)  (3.092) (-3.178) (-0.176) 
 





Residual S.E. and Cross-Correlations 
          DEXDSPOT     DIUS       DIUK 
          0.0075152  0.0002248  0.0003587 
DEXDSPOT   1.000 
DIUS       -0.055     1.000 
DIUK       -0.032     0.179      1.000 
 
 
LOG(|Sigma|)                      = -42.484 
Information Criteria: SC          = -41.119 
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                      H-Q         = -41.629 
Trace Correlation                 =   0.251 
 
Tests for Autocorrelation 
Ljung-Box(53):        ChiSqr(459) = 526.128 [0.016] 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(9)   =   8.719 [0.464] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(9)   =   3.985 [0.912] 
 
Test for Normality:   ChiSqr(6)   =  63.417 [0.000] 
 
Test for ARCH: 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(36)  = 119.929 [0.000] 





         Mean   Std.Dev Skewness Kurtosis Maximum Minimum 
DEXDSPOT  0.000  0.008     0.113   3.993    0.029  -0.023 
DIUS      0.000  0.000    -0.106   4.436    0.001  -0.001 
DIUK      0.000  0.000     0.492   5.836    0.001  -0.001 
 
         ARCH(2)         Normality          R-Squared 
DEXDSPOT  6.013 [0.049]    9.709  [0.008]   0.327 
DIUS     20.920 [0.000]   17.099  [0.000]   0.236 




RE-NORMALIZATION OF THE EIGENVECTORS: 
 
THE EIGENVECTOR(s)(transposed) 
        EXDSPOT   IUS    IUK    CONSTANT 
Beta(1) -124.189 0.930 -102.143    1.206 
 
PI 
       EXDSPOT    IUS     IUK    CONSTANT 
DEXDSP  -0.388   0.003   -0.319    0.004 
       (-6.018) (6.018) (-6.018)  (6.018) 
DIUS    -0.007   0.000   -0.006    0.000 
       (-3.841) (3.841) (-3.841)  (3.841) 
DIUK    -0.004   0.000   -0.003    0.000 
       (-1.273) (1.273) (-1.273)  (1.273) 
 
Log-Likelihood = 4494.699 
 
TEST OF RESTRICTED MODEL:    CHISQR(3) = 9.862 [0.020] 
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BARTLETT CORRECTION:         CHISQR(3) = 8.451 [0.038] 
(Correction Factor: 1.167) 
 
RE-NORMALIZATION OF THE EIGENVECTORS: 
 
THE EIGENVECTOR(s)(transposed) 
        EXDSPOT   IUS     IUK    CONSTANT 
Beta(1) 122.103 122.103 -122.103    0.000 
 
 
THE MATRICES BASED ON 1 COINTEGRATING VECTOR: 
 
BETA(transposed) 
        EXDSPOT  IUS   IUK   CONSTANT 
Beta(1)   1.000 1.000 -1.000    0.000 
          (.NA) (.NA)  (.NA)    (.NA) 
 
ALPHA 
       Alpha(1) 
DEXDSP  -0.371 
       (-5.826) 
DIUS    -0.005 
       (-2.765) 
DIUK    -0.001 
       (-0.298) 
 
PI 
       EXDSPOT    IUS      IUK   CONSTANT 
DEXDSP  -0.371   -0.371   0.371     0.000 
       (-5.826) (-5.826) (5.826)    (.NA) 
DIUS    -0.005   -0.005   0.005     0.000 
       (-2.765) (-2.765) (2.765)    (.NA) 
DIUK    -0.001   -0.001   0.001     0.000 
       (-0.298) (-0.298) (0.298)    (.NA) 
 




MODEL SUMMARY: IKE Gap Model 
The Gap Model was normalized on the expected change in s, 
which then also sets the interest rates to coefficients of 
1 and -1 
Sample:                      1982:12 to 2000:09 (214 
observations) 
Effective Sample:            1983:02 to 2000:09 (212 
observations) 
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Obs. - No. of variables:     192 
System variables:            EXDSPOT BUS BUK GAPMAC2 
Constant/Trend:              Restricted Constant 
No. of Centered Seasonals:   12 
Lags in VAR:                 2 
 
I(2) analysis not available for the specified model. 
 
The unrestricted estimates: 
BETA(transposed) 
        EXDSPOT     BUS      BUK    GAPMAC2 CONSTANT 
Beta(1) -135.888  -231.676  123.213 347.143    1.049 
Beta(2)   -3.238 -1128.054  884.430 833.244    0.880 
Beta(3)   -3.984   127.830 -496.343 601.507    2.369 
Beta(4)    1.917  -614.985   65.075 -27.700    3.269 
 
ALPHA 
       Alpha(1) Alpha(2) Alpha(3) Alpha(4) 
DEXDSP   0.003   -0.000   -0.000   -0.000 
        (6.458) (-0.291) (-0.184) (-0.728) 
DBUS     0.000   -0.000    0.000    0.000 
        (2.780) (-0.226)  (0.690)  (1.652) 
DBUK     0.000   -0.000    0.000   -0.000 
        (0.663) (-1.401)  (1.996) (-0.025) 
DGAPMA   0.000   -0.000   -0.000    0.000 
        (0.256) (-4.014) (-0.507)  (0.344) 
 
PI 
       EXDSPOT    BUS      BUK    GAPMAC2  CONSTANT 
DEXDSP  -0.448   -0.379    0.297    0.974    0.002 
       (-6.451) (-0.567)  (0.569)  (1.759)  (0.868) 
DBUS    -0.006   -0.021   -0.001    0.018    0.000 
       (-2.770) (-1.004) (-0.090)  (1.056)  (2.288) 
DBUK    -0.002    0.028   -0.036    0.004    0.000 
       (-0.688)  (1.293) (-2.100)  (0.244)  (0.964) 
DGAPMA  -0.000    0.087   -0.067   -0.074   -0.000 
       (-0.140)  (3.196) (-3.169) (-3.291) (-0.784) 
 




 p-r r Eig.Value Trace  Trace* Frac95 P-Value P-Value* 
  4  0     0.189 69.545 67.352 53.945   0.001    0.002 
  3  1     0.077 25.166 24.405 35.070   0.395    0.442 
  2  2     0.021  8.160  7.699 20.164   0.809    0.844 
  1  3     0.017  3.681  3.165  9.142   0.473    0.560 




RE-NORMALIZATION OF THE EIGENVECTORS: 
 
THE EIGENVECTOR(s)(transposed) 
        EXDSPOT    BUS      BUK   GAPMAC2 CONSTANT 
Beta(1) -135.888 -231.676 123.213 347.143    1.049 
 
 
THE MATRICES BASED ON 1 COINTEGRATING VECTOR: 
 
BETA(transposed) 
        EXDSPOT   BUS     BUK    GAPMAC2  CONSTANT 
Beta(1)   1.000  1.705   -0.907   -2.555   -0.008 
          (.NA) (1.263) (-0.814) (-2.331) (-1.372) 
 
ALPHA 
       Alpha(1) 
DEXDSP  -0.448 
       (-6.448) 
DBUS    -0.006 
       (-2.759) 
DBUK    -0.002 
       (-0.654) 
DGAPMA  -0.001 
       (-0.246) 
 
PI 
       EXDSPOT    BUS      BUK   GAPMAC2 CONSTANT 
DEXDSP  -0.448   -0.763   0.406   1.144    0.003 
       (-6.448) (-6.448) (6.448) (6.448)  (6.448) 
DBUS    -0.006   -0.010   0.006   0.016    0.000 
       (-2.759) (-2.759) (2.759) (2.759)  (2.759) 
DBUK    -0.002   -0.003   0.001   0.004    0.000 
       (-0.654) (-0.654) (0.654) (0.654)  (0.654) 
DGAPMA  -0.001   -0.001   0.001   0.002    0.000 
       (-0.246) (-0.246) (0.246) (0.246)  (0.246) 
 
Log-Likelihood = 6298.561 
 
TEST OF RESTRICTED MODEL:    CHISQR(2) = 0.810 [0.667] 
BARTLETT CORRECTION:         CHISQR(2) = 0.638 [0.727] 
(Correction Factor: 1.270) 
 
RE-NORMALIZATION OF THE EIGENVECTORS: 
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THE EIGENVECTOR(s)(transposed) 
        EXDSPOT   BUS     BUK    GAPMAC2  CONSTANT 
Beta(1) 133.930 133.930 -133.930 -253.371   -0.330 
 
PI 
       EXDSPOT    BUS      BUK   GAPMAC2 CONSTANT 
DEXDSP  -0.443   -0.443   0.443   0.839    0.001 
       (-6.485) (-6.485) (6.485) (6.485)  (6.485) 
DBUS    -0.006   -0.006   0.006   0.010    0.000 
       (-2.539) (-2.539) (2.539) (2.539)  (2.539) 
DBUK    -0.001   -0.001   0.001   0.002    0.000 
       (-0.566) (-0.566) (0.566) (0.566)  (0.566) 
DGAPMA  -0.001   -0.001   0.001   0.002    0.000 
       (-0.406) (-0.406) (0.406) (0.406)  (0.406) 
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